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Abstract 
The modern organisation relies heavily on information to function effectively. With 
such reliance on information, it is vital that information be protected from both 
internal (employees) and external threats. The protection of information or 
information security to a large extent depends on the behaviour of humans 
(employees) in the organisation. The behaviour of employees is one of the top 
information security issues facing organisations as the human factor is regarded as 
the weakest link in the security chain. 
To address this human factor many researchers have suggested the fostering of 
a culture of information security so that information security becomes second nature 
to employees. Information security culture as defined for this research study exists in 
four levels namely artefacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions and 
information security knowledge. An important step in the fostering of an information 
security culture is the assessment of the current state of such a culture. Gaps in 
current approaches for assessing information security culture were identified and this 
research study proposes the use of a control framework to address the identified 
gaps.  
This research study focuses on the assessment of information security culture 
and addresses 5 research objectives namely 1) to describe information security 
culture in the field of information security, 2) to determine ways to foster information 
security culture in an organisation, 3) to demonstrate the gap in current approaches 
used to assess information security culture, 4) to determine the components that 
could be used for the assessment of information security culture for each of the 
culture’s underlying levels and 5) to describe a process for the assessment of 
information security culture for all four levels. This research study follows a 
qualitative approach utilising a design science strategy and multi-method qualitative 
data collection techniques including literature review, qualitative content analysis, 
argumentation, and modelling techniques. The research methods provide a means 
for the interpretation of the data and the development of the proposed control 
framework. 
Keywords: Information security culture, control frameworks, assessment 
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1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research study. It starts by providing a 
context to the research area in the form of a background in section 1.2. This is 
followed by a description of the problem area in section 1.3 and this, in turn, leads to 
the problem statement in section 1.4. The research questions are stated in section 
1.5, followed by the statement of the research objectives in section 1.6. Section 1.7 
outlines the significance of the research study. This is followed by the methodology 
in section 1.8. Section 1.9 outlines the research scope and delineation. This is 
followed by ethical considerations for the research study in section 1.10 and a layout 
of the research study in section 1.11 with section 1.12 concluding the chapter. 
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1.2 Background 
Information is an important asset to any organisation (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005a) with 
several organisations relying heavily on information for the smooth running of their 
day-to-day operations. Consequently, these organisations would suffer significant 
business disruption if their information were either corrupted or became unavailable 
(PWC, 2008). It is, thus, essential that information be protected. 
As a result, information security has become a critical business function (Von 
Roessing, 2010). Information security provides an organisation with important 
benefits, including protecting the organisation’s ability to function; enabling the safe 
operation of applications; protecting organisational data and safeguarding technical 
assets (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). However, if these benefits of information security 
are to be realised within an organisation, proper information security management is 
required. 
Information security management has changed over the years because the 
computing environment has changed from localised mainframes to distributed 
networks. The pervasiveness of the Internet, extranet and intranet has made 
managing information security far more complex and critical than previously (Harris, 
2008). The emergence of e-commerce, the loss of organisational barriers through 
the use of remote access facilities as well as high profile information security 
exposures have all raised the profile of information risk and increased the need for 
effective information security management (ISM). An information security strategy is 
at the centre of ISM and involves understanding the information security risks and 
developing cost effective controls in order to mitigate the risks (Kairab, 2005). It is 
essential that the information security strategy adopted should ensure compliance 
with legal requirements, maintain a cultural fit and provide a balance between 
information security and business needs (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). However, even 
with the best of strategies, management is still faced with the problem of employees 
bypassing the security controls and causing security breaches (Dhillon, 2001b). This 
problem is known as the “human factor”. 
The human factor remains a risk issue in the management of information 
security. Various surveys have shown that several of the information security 
breaches identified are caused by human error (Bean, 2006; Ponemon institute, 
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2009; PWC, 2010b). In other words, people often represent the weakest link in the 
security chain and, thus, management should not only take technology into account 
in its information security strategy but also the people factor. The people factor often 
arises as a result of the fact that users are more likely to ignore security if it inhibits 
their completing of their work (Besnard & Arief, 2004). According to Schneier (2000), 
“if you think technology can solve your problems, then you don’t understand the 
problems and you don’t understand the technology”. Dhillon (2001b) also alludes to 
the fact that technical or formal control measures alone are inadequate to prevent 
computer security breaches. Accordingly, in order to address the human factor 
management should strive to maintain a cultural fit as one of its strategic objectives 
to ensure that the underlying values in respect of information security mesh with the 
values of the organisation (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). In addition, it is vital that 
organisations foster an information security culture (B. Von Solms, 2000). 
Having introduced information security culture and the importance to foster 
information security culture, the next section provides an overview of the current 
problem area regarding the assessment of information security culture. 
 
1.3 Description of problem area 
Businesses today operate within an interconnected and global environment which 
enables them to collaborate with one another and to share information resources. At 
the same time this interconnectivity exposes an organisation to several internal 
(employees) and external threats. According to Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, and Morrow 
(2006), internal threat is among the top information security issues facing 
organisations, as the human factor is regarded as the weakest link in the security 
chain. In order to address this “human factor” researchers have suggested that an 
information security culture be fostered (Martins & J. Eloff, 2002a; Thomson, R. Von 
Solms, & Louw, 2006a; Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2005; B. Von Solms, 2000; 
Vroom & R. Von Solms, 2004).  
Information security culture, as defined for the purposes of this research study, 
stems from Schein’s model of organisational culture. Schein defined organisational 
culture as existing on the following three levels, namely, artefacts, espoused values 
and shared tacit assumptions (Schein, 2009). This definition was adapted to apply to 
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information security culture by Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010) to include a 
fourth level, namely, information security knowledge specific to information security. 
Organisational culture and information security culture are discussed in depth in a 
dedicated chapter.  
With regards to fostering an information security culture, the first step involves 
assessing the current state of the culture (ISACA, 2011). This assessment may 
follow the auditing approach as utilised by (Martins & J. Eloff, 2002a; Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003a; 2003b). However, their approach did not make use of a formal 
auditing guideline/framework and neither did it assess all four levels of information 
security culture in a comprehensive way. The identification of gaps and possible 
enhancements to existing information security culture assessment approaches (for 
example, Martins & J. Eloff 2002a, Schlienger & Teufel 2003a; 2003b) formed the 
basis for this research study and argues that a formal IS control framework, as an 
integrated IS auditing and process approach, could play a role in assessing the four 
levels of information security culture. The identified gap in the current approaches to 
the assessment of an information security culture will be explored further in a 
dedicated chapter. It also forms the basis of the paper published by Okere, Van 
Niekerk, and Carroll (2012) and is included in this research study in Appendix A. 
Having discussed the problem area, the next section provides an overview of the 
problem statement. 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
As described in sections 1.2 and 1.3, one of the challenges faced by the 
management of organisations with regards to information security is the non-
compliance of employees to information security policies, therefore “the human 
factor”. In addressing the human factor challenges many authors (Martins & J. Eloff, 
2002a; Thomson, R. Von Solms, & Louw, 2006a; Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 
2005) have suggested the fostering of an information security culture as a security 
strategy. The first step in fostering an information security culture is to understand 
the current vs. suggested state of such a culture (ISACA, 2011).  
According to Schlienger and Teufel (2003a; 2003b), there is no unique toolset 
and method with which to study information security culture with regards to what to 
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assess and how to assess the said information security culture. In other words, there 
is the problem that there is no published, widely accepted and consolidated 
approach that indicates the way in which an assessment of information security 
culture should be conducted. Indeed, researchers have called for more research in 
this area (Maynard, Ruighaver, & Chia, 2002; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003a; 2003b). 
In order to achieve a current understanding of the level of information security 
culture in an organisation, a number of researchers have focused on the assessment 
of information security culture, i.e. Da Veiga & J. Eloff, Schlienger & Teufel. 
However, as published at the Information Security South Africa conference in 2012 
(Okere et al., 2012), some limitations were identified with the current assessment 
approaches namely: 
 Current information security culture assessment approaches do not 
comprehensively assess all four levels of information security culture. They 
focus primarily on the shared tacit assumption layer of such a culture. 
 Current information security culture researchers do not utilise a formal 
auditing guideline or framework when assessing such a culture, or do not 
explicitly espouse the use of such a framework. 
This, in turn, leads onto the research problem: 
There is a lack of a formalized and integrated control structure and process 
for the assessment of the current state of information security culture 
across all its underlying levels. 
 
To address this research problem, a number of research questions and objectives 
need to be addressed. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
The research problem defined in section 1.4 will be addressed by endeavouring to 
answer the following research questions. 
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Primary question: 
How can an integrated IS auditing and process approach contribute to the 
development of a control framework for the assessment of the current state of 
information security culture across all its underlying levels? 
Sub-questions: 
1. How is information security culture defined in the field of information security? 
2. How may information security culture be fostered within an organisation? 
3. What is lacking in the existing approaches which may be used to assess 
information security culture? 
4. Which components could be utilised in the assessment of information security 
culture for each of the culture’s underlying levels? 
5. What process may be followed in assessing information security culture for all 
four levels? 
 
1.6 Research objectives 
Primary objective:  
To develop a control framework for the assessment of information security 
culture across all its underlying levels. 
Secondary objectives: 
1. To describe information security culture in the field of information security. 
2. To determine ways to foster information security culture in an organisation. 
3. To demonstrate the gap in current approaches used to assess information 
security culture. 
4. To determine the components that could be used for the assessment of 
information security culture for each of the culture’s underlying levels. 
5. To describe a process for the assessment of information security culture for all 
four levels. 
Having identified the research objectives, the next section outlines the 
significance of this research study. 
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1.7 Significance of research 
This research study focuses on the assessment of information security culture 
across all its underlying levels. Current approaches for assessing information 
security culture do not address all the underling levels of information security culture. 
The primary contribution of this research study will be the development of a control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture across all its underlying 
levels. 
Having outlined the significance of this research study, the next section outlines 
the methodology for this research study. 
 
1.8 Methodology 
This research study follows a qualitative approach and incorporates a broad 
spectrum of methods. The methodology will be discussed in detail in a dedicated 
chapter. 
The next section outlines the scope and delineation of this research study. 
 
1.9 Research scope and delineation 
This research study focuses on the four underlying levels of information security 
culture, residing within the information security domain. The scope of this research 
study includes: 
 Identifying the gap in current approaches for assessing information security 
culture. 
 Developing an integrated and formalized control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture across all its underlying levels. 
It is not the intention of this research study to re-invent the wheel and incorporation 
of this research into existing assessment approaches is recommended. 
This research study entails adopting principles from relevant existing IS control 
frameworks in the development of the proposed control framework for the 
assessment of an organisation’s information security culture across four underlying 
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levels namely artefacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions and information 
security knowledge. Based on the literature study, three existing control frameworks 
were regarded most prominent to this research study, namely COSO, COBIT and 
ISO 27002. COSO and COBIT are relevant because both are the most widely used 
control frameworks ISO27002 is relevant because ISO27002 is specific to 
information security and this research study focuses on information security 
culture. 
Based on the literature review, this research study focuses on eight information 
security culture components, namely: top management support for information 
security [ISCC1], regulatory and legal requirement for information security [ISCC2], 
organisational structures and responsibilities for information security [ISCC3], 
information security budget [ISCC4], information security awareness, training and 
education [ISCC5], information security incident management [ISCC6], information 
security compliance [ISCC7], continuous improvement through change management 
and monitoring or management review [ISCC8]. 
The validation of the control framework will be via expert\elite interviews and 
empirical work will be left for future studies. 
The next section outlines the ethical considerations for this research study. 
 
1.10 Ethical considerations 
No vulnerable groups as defined by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University’s 
ethical guidelines are involved in this research study, therefore no further ethical 
consideration is required. 
The next section outlines the layout of the research study. 
 
1.11 Layout of chapters 
This research study consists of seven chapters and is laid out according to the 
general guidelines of Hofstee (2006). The layout of the chapters is illustrated in 
figure 1.1 and outlined below. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides background information for the research study. It 
includes a description of the problem area, the problem statement, research 
questions and objectives, significance of the research, methodology, research 
scope and delineation, ethical consideration and a layout of the research 
study chapters. 
 Chapter 2: Research philosophy, process and methods 
This chapter describes the philosophical assumptions for this research study. 
It describes the research process followed incorporating the various methods 
used. 
 Chapter 3: Information security culture 
This chapter explores the various definition of information security culture in 
the field of information security as well as how information security culture 
could be fostered and assessed in an organisation. The limitations of existing 
assessment approaches are argued. 
 Chapter 4: IS control frameworks 
This chapter discusses IS control frameworks in order to provide background 
and context on how IS control frameworks can contribute to the development 
of a control framework for the assessment of information security culture. 
 Chapter 5: A control framework for assessing information security 
culture 
In this chapter a control framework for assessing information security culture 
is developed and its applicability argued. 
 Chapter 6: Validation of control framework 
In this chapter the developed framework is validated by means of an 
expert/elite interview. The selection of experts was based on availability and 
knowledge of the problem area. 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the research study by providing a summary of the 
research study results, contributions, and suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 1.1 Layout of chapters 
 
1.12 Conclusion 
This chapter provided some background to this research study. The chapter 
discussed the problem area leading to the problem statement. Research questions 
to address the research problem were stated as well as the research objectives. The 
significance of the research study and the methodology employed in this research 
study were outlined. The research scope and delineation were identified as well as a 
layout of the research study chapters. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided background information to this research study. The 
chapter also indicated the problem statement, research questions and research 
objectives. 
This chapter focuses on the research process and methods used in this research 
study. In order to answer the research questions it was necessary to follow a proper 
research process and use the appropriate methods. 
This chapter starts with a brief description of the research philosophy in section 
2.2. This is followed by a discussion of the validity and reliability of a qualitative 
research study in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the research onion, while section 
2.5 describes the research process with section 2.6 concluding the chapter. 
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2.2 Research philosophy 
All research starts with a philosophical assumption, irrespective of whether the 
researcher is aware of the assumption or not. According to Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill (2007, p. 101), a research philosophy “relates to the development of 
knowledge and the nature of that knowledge”. In addition, the research philosophy 
contains important assumptions about the way in which a researcher views the world 
with such assumptions affecting the researcher’s choices, including the research 
paradigm, research methodology and research methods. 
A researcher’s primary philosophical choice may influence the choice of either 
qualitative or a quantitative research. This choice would depend on whether the 
researcher views reality as a concrete structure that may be objectively measured 
(quantitative) or as a projection of human imagination with the subjectivity of the 
researcher being acknowledged (qualitative). In qualitative research the focus is on 
the interpretation of the research rather than on the measurement of the research 
results (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
This research study is aimed at developing a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture across all its underlying levels. The focus 
on information security culture signifies the involvement of people and, thus, the 
emphasis is more on the interpretation of what is being researched rather than on 
what is being measured. Thus, to a large extent, philosophically speaking, this 
research study adopts a phenomenological approach which, in turn, leans towards a 
qualitative research. A phenomenological approach is a qualitative approach to 
conducting a research that focuses on people’s subjective experiences and 
interpretations of the world (Trochim, 2006). 
According to Creswell (2007) and Saunders et al. (2007), there are five 
philosophical assumptions that may influence the decision to choose qualitative 
research. Table 2.1 summarises these assumptions. 
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Table 2.1 Philosophical assumptions influencing the selection of qualitative research 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
ASSUMPTION 
DESCRIPTION 
Ontological The researcher in this category perceives reality as being both 
subjective and multiple (realities of the researcher, the subject 
being researched and the reader/audience). This category asks 
the question: “What is the nature of reality?” 
Epistemological The researcher in this category tries to minimise the distance 
between him/her and that which is being researched. Through a 
prolonged stay in the research field the researcher moves from an 
observational “outside” role to an “inside” role. This category asks 
the question: “What is the relationship between the researcher and 
that which is being researched?” 
Axiological In this category, the researcher acknowledges the value-laden 
nature and biases in research and, thus, the researcher tries to 
report the values and biases actively. This category asks the 
question: “What is the role of values?” 
Rhetorical The researcher in this category employs literary forms of writing 
and uses an informal style that utilises personal voice and specific 
terms. This category asks the question: “What is the language of 
research?” 
Methodological In this category, the researcher is concerned with the way in which 
the entire research process is conceptualised. The researcher 
usually uses inductive logic, studying the topic within its context 
before using an emerging design. This category asks the question: 
“What is the process of research?” 
 
As stated in this section (2.2), this research study follows a qualitative research. 
Table 2.1 identified five philosophical assumptions which may influence the 
researcher’s selection of a qualitative research approach. For the purposes of this 
research study, the qualitative approach is further explored.  
A qualitative research study is “an inquiry process of understanding based on 
distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explores a social or human problem” 
(Creswell, 2007, pp. 16-19). There are certain concerns regarding the validity of a 
Page | 14  
 
qualitative research study as a result of the fact that qualitative research is 
interpretive in nature. The next section discusses the validity of qualitative research. 
 
2.3 The validity/quality of qualitative research 
The issue of the validity of qualitative research has been discussed by various 
researchers (Brock-Utne, 1996; Easterby-Smith, Golden-Biddle, & Locke, 2008; 
Golafshani, 2003; Meyrick, 2006; Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). 
This section summarises this issue. Meyrick (2006) provides a step-by-step 
framework to enable readers to make a “value judgement about rigor and quality” in 
qualitative research. Table 2.2 presents this step-by-step guide. 
 
Table 2.2 Step-by-step guide to the quality framework for a qualitative research study 
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE DESCRIPTION 
Researcher epistemological 
and theoretical stance 
According to Meyrick (2006), “good quality research ensures that the 
epistemological and theoretical stance of the researcher is stated 
clearly in the study”. 
Methods The research aims and objectives as well as the research questions 
should be clearly stated to enable appropriate methods to be 
selected. With the objectives clearly stated, the reader may judge 
the appropriateness of the methodology selected and whether the 
objectives meet the criteria (Meyrick, 2006). 
Sampling The rationale and the theory behind the sampling techniques used 
should be clearly established. Sampling should be conducted in 
such a manner that it ensures the generalizability of the results 
(Collingridge & Gantt, 2008). 
Data collection The manner in which the data is collected should be described with 
sufficient transparency to enable the reader to judge the 
reasonableness of the methods used and the decisions made 
(Meyrick, 2006). 
Analysis It is important to provide enough information regarding the “route” a 
research takes from data to conclusion (Meyrick, 2006). Such a 
route may vary from research to research. However, enough 
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STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE DESCRIPTION 
information should be available to enable the reader to follow the 
process and to judge whether the process or steps taken are “fair”, 
“reasonable” or “regular” (Meyrick, 2006). 
Results and conclusion It is important to demonstrate exactly how the data shaped the 
conclusion in order to reinforce the link between the data and the 
conclusions (Meyrick, 2006).  
 
It is clear from the step-by-step guide presented in table 2.2 that it is 
extremely important that a researcher carrying out a qualitative study ensure that the 
necessary information is available to enable the reader to make an informed 
judgement of the validity of the research study. In order to do this, the researcher 
may make use of a construct such as the “research onion”, as proposed by 
Saunders et al. (2007) as a guideline. The research onion is described in the next 
section. 
 
2.4 The research onion 
The research “onion” refers to a layered approach to providing an explanation for the 
research choices made by a researcher (Saunders et al., 2007). Figure 2.1 depicts 
the research onion.  
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Figure 2.1 The research onion (Saunders et al., 2007) 
 
When using the research onion, it is not necessary for the researcher to include 
every aspect of the research onion but only those applicable to his/her research 
study. The aspects of the research onion which were considered to be applicable to 
this research study are summarised in the next sub-sections. 
 
2.4.1 Philosophies 
At the outermost layer is the research philosophy wherein lies the researcher’s 
philosophical stance. This research study employs a pragmatic philosophy in terms 
of which the researcher believes that the choice of philosophy is determined based 
on the research questions (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
2.4.2 Approaches 
To a large extent this layer influences the choice of either a deductive or an inductive 
approach. A deductive approach works from the more general to the more specific 
and involves the development of a theory or hypothesis and then the formulation of a 
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strategy to test the hypothesis. On the other hand, an inductive approach works from 
the more specific to the more general and involves the collection of data and then 
the development of a theory or hypothesis based on the analysis of the data 
collected.  
This research study is both inductive and deductive. The researcher collected 
data (components and process) and then developed a theory (framework) based on 
analysis and integration of the data (inductive). The researcher also worked from the 
more general organisational culture to the more specific information security culture 
(deductive approach). The researcher examined the way in which processes and 
control objectives apply to IS auditing and then mapped them to the more 
specialised needs applicable to the assessment of information security culture 
(deductive approach). 
 
2.4.3 Strategies 
The research strategy arises from the research approach and includes case studies, 
surveys, action research, and so forth. According to Saunders et al. (2007), the 
choice of a research strategy should be guided by the research questions and the 
research objectives, the availability of time and resources, the degree of existing 
knowledge and the researcher’s philosophy. For the purposes of this research study 
the researcher utilised design science as the research strategy. According to 
Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004), design science addresses research through 
the building and evaluation of artefacts designed to meet the identified business 
need. This research study develops an artefact (framework) designed to meet the 
identified business need (assessing the current state of information security culture). 
Hevner et al., (2004) suggest seven guidelines for design science. Table 2.3 
describes the way in which this research study satisfies these seven guidelines. 
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Table 2.3 Design science research guidelines in relation to this research study 
GUIDELINES APPLICABILITY TO RESEARCH STUDY 
Guideline 1: Design as an artefact According to Hevner et al. (2004), a design science research 
is required to produce a viable artefact in the form of a 
construct, method, a model or an instantiation. The control 
framework developed in chapter 5 meets this requirement.  
Guideline 2: Problem relevance The need for a control framework to address the gap 
identified was argued extensively in section 2.6.3 and was 
published at the information security of South Africa (ISSA) 
conference. 
Guideline 3: Design evaluation The control framework was evaluated using a descriptive 
method which involved argumentation as described by 
(Mason, 2002) while the utility of the control framework was 
demonstrated using detailed scenarios as described in 
section 5.7. 
Guideline 4: Research contributions The control framework developed for the assessment of 
information security culture constitutes the primary 
contribution of the research study. 
Guideline 5: Research rigour Research rigour was achieved by adhering to the guidelines 
presented by Creswell (1998) and Hevner et al. (2004) in 
respect of phenomenological research methods. The 
validation of the control framework by expert/elite interview 
also ensured research rigour. 
Guideline 6: Design as a search 
process 
The process undertaken to design the control framework 
occurred over a two-year period. The control framework 
went through various versions. Each version was discussed 
and subsequently based on feedback from peer reviews. 
The framework was refined until its final version. 
Guideline 7: Communication of 
research 
The control framework was communicated by means of 
publication and validation. The research study itself also 
constitutes a means of communication. 
 
2.4.4 Choices 
Following on the research strategy layer the research choice relates to the choice of 
the way in which the researcher combines qualitative or quantitative techniques and 
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procedures. According to Saunders et al. (2007), the research choice may be a 
mono method (a single data collection technique and analysis), multi-method (more 
than one data collection technique which may be either qualitative or quantitative) or 
a mixed method (combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection 
techniques and analysis). This research study used a combination of qualitative 
methods. 
 
2.4.5 Techniques and procedures 
This layer is the innermost layer of the research onion and includes the data 
collection and analysis techniques and procedures, for example, focus groups, 
interviews, and questionnaires. This research study utilised a variety of methods for 
the data collection and analysis. These are explained further in the next section 
which addresses the research process. 
This research study may, thus, be described as a pragmatic, deductive and 
inductive study based on design science and utilising multi-method qualitative 
techniques and procedures. The next section describes the research process which 
was followed in this research study. 
 
2.5 Research process 
This section describes the research process followed in this research study in a 
narrative way. 
A research may be defined as “the systematic collection and interpretation of 
information with a clear purpose to find out things” (Saunders et al., 2007, p. 610). 
The research process followed in this study entailed the use of several research 
methods, including a literature review, qualitative content analysis, argumentation, 
modelling and elite/expert interviews. The research methods are highlighted in the 
process. 
An initial, general literature review was conducted in order to gain better 
understanding of the research area (i.e. information security culture and IS auditing) 
and to justify the research problem. According to Hofstee (2006) and Kumar (2005), 
a literature review helps to bring clarity and focus to the research problem, improve 
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methodology and broaden the knowledge base pertaining to the research area. The 
literature review entailed reading journal articles, internet articles, published 
frameworks\best practices, conference papers and books with related content and 
the information gathered was used in the writing of the research study proposal.  
A further literature review was conducted on the topic of information security 
culture and focused on the creation, fostering and assessment of information 
security culture ‒ see chapter 3. A number of research projects focusing on the 
assessment of information security culture were identified. A qualitative content 
analysis was conducted on the research projects identified according to the 
methods described by Krippendorff (2004). Qualitative content analysis is a research 
technique which involves making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other 
meaningful matter) in respect of the contexts in which they are used (Krippendorff, 
2004). On the basis of the qualitative content analysis gaps were identified in the 
current assessment approaches to information security culture and an argument for 
the use of a control framework in order to close the gaps was put forward. The gaps 
which had been identified and the proposed solution were published at the 
Information Security of South Africa (ISSA) conference. 
Following feedback from the ISSA conference both a further literature review and 
qualitative content analysis were conducted on the IS control frameworks, i.e. 
COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 (chapter 4) and the research questions and research 
objectives were reviewed. It should be noted that ISO 27002 is also an ISO/IEC 
standard of good practice for information security that describes a control framework. 
Qualitative content analysis was conducted on COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 
frameworks in order to identify which components of the frameworks could apply to 
information security culture and its assessment. Certain components of COSO, 
COBIT and ISO 27002 were identified and their applicability to the assessment of 
information security culture argued. 
Using the information gathered from the literature review, qualitative content 
analysis in chapter three and four and the feedback from the ISSA conference, 
modelling techniques and analytical argumentation were used to develop a control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture ‒ see chapter 5. The 
various components of the control framework and the way in which they fit together 
were used to develop different versions of the framework until the final version 
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emerged. The applicability of the control framework was argued using different 
scenarios. 
The quality and usability of the final version of the framework was then validated 
using an elite/expert interview – see chapter 6. An elite/expert interview is a type of 
interview which is conducted with a specific category of interviewee, namely, an 
“elite”. An “elite” is a person who is considered to be prominent, influential and/or 
well informed in an organisation or community (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 155). 
The participants for the elite/expert interview were selected based on the fact that 
they were experts in the field of study and one of the participant’s research studies in 
this field was, in fact, used in this research study. For the purposes of this research 
study, the expert\elite interview was conducted in the form of a formal review by the 
selected experts via email. The formal review by the expert reviewers was for the 
purpose of validating the developed control framework. 
Following the expert/elite interviews the control framework which had been 
developed was enhanced by incorporating the feedback from the expert/elite 
interviews. Figure 2.2 illustrates the research process. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The research process 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the philosophical assumptions underlying this research 
study. A qualitative approach was adopted for this study and the validity of qualitative 
research was discussed. The research onion was discussed as a guideline that may 
be followed to present the necessary information required by a reader in order to 
judge the validity of a qualitative research study. This was followed by a description 
of the research process which incorporates the various methods used in this 
research study. 
This research study is based on a pragmatic, deductive and inductive approach. 
The study utilises qualitative methods and is supported by expert/elite interviews as 
a source of verification. 
The next chapter will focus on the field of information security culture in order to 
show the significance of the field of information security culture which is the focus of 
this research study. 
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Chapter 3 : Information security culture 
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3.1 Introduction 
Information is an important asset in any organisation. However, it may be exposed to 
various threats, even from within the organisation (employees). Internal threat is 
among the top information security issues facing organisations (Knapp et al., 2006). 
In an effort to address this internal threat, several researchers have suggested that 
an information security culture be either developed or fostered (Thomson, R. Von 
Solms, & Louw, 2006b; Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2005; Vroom & R. Von Solms, 
2004). The first step in the fostering/development of an information security culture 
involves the assessment of the current state of the culture (ISACA, 2011). 
Page | 24  
 
This chapter will address the following research questions as stated in section 1.5: 
Sub-question 1: How is information security culture defined in the field of information 
security? 
Sub-question 2: How may information security culture be fostered within an 
organisation? 
Sub-question 3: What is lacking in the existing approaches which may be used to 
assess information security culture? 
In order to answer sub-questions 1 – 3, this chapter provides background to the 
research topic in section 3.2 by covering information security and its management 
through the use of controls, the challenges that management face in respect of 
information security management (ISM) with regards to the human factor and the 
need to foster and assess information security culture. Section 3.3 discusses 
organisational culture of which information security culture is a part. Organisational 
culture will be defined using Schein’s model of culture which consists of three levels. 
In section 3.4 information security culture will then be defined incorporating the 
various ways in which researchers have defined the concept. Section 3.5 discusses 
the fostering of information security culture. This culture may be fostered by 
incorporating the creation of information security culture as well as the methods and 
process used to foster the information security culture. Section 3.6 discusses the 
assessment of information security culture and includes the role of assessment in 
information security culture change as well as current assessment approaches and 
their limitations. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Background 
Information may be regarded as the lifeblood of many organisations and it is used to 
drive most business processes in order to gain a competitive advantage (R. Von 
Solms & B. Von Solms, 2006) With many organisations relying on technology to 
process information and to make critical decisions, there is an urgent need to protect 
information so as to ensure its confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) (Tarte, 
2003) In other words, it is essential that information, which may exist in the form of 
Page | 25  
 
paper, electronic format, films, voice recordings of conversations be suitably 
protected (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005b). 
Information security involves the safeguarding of the CIA of information from 
various threats in order to reduce business risk, increase return on investments and 
ensure business continuity (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005b). Information security is regarded 
as an extremely important and challenging issue facing organisations today in view 
of the reliance of organisations on technology and global interconnectivity (Rotvold, 
2008). Organisations have become increasingly exposed to numerous threats which 
come in a variety of forms and this, in turn, has made the management of 
information security extremely difficult (Rotvold, 2008). However, information security 
may be attained through the establishment of an information security management 
system (ISMS). 
An information security management system is defined as “that part of the overall 
management system, based on a business risk approach, to establish, implement, 
operate, monitor, review, maintain and improve information security and includes 
organisational structure, policies, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, 
procedures, processes and resources” (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005, p. 2). Thus, an ISMS 
is established to ensure that sufficient and proportionate security controls are 
selected to secure information assets and to secure the trust of interested parties 
(ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
A security control is a countermeasure which is used to reduce the risk posed by 
a security threat. Security controls may be physical, technical or operational. 
Physical controls are concerned with the physical aspect of security, for example, the 
use of locks, badges, alarms, security guards and similar measures to limit access to 
computers, similar equipment and the processing facility (Tipton & Krause, 2007). 
Technical (logical) controls involve using the safeguards which are included in 
computer hardware, operations or applications software, communications hardware 
and software and similar devices. Examples include encryption and smart cards 
(Tipton, n d). On the other hand, operational (administrative) controls deal with the 
human behaviour and, as such, they are essentially policies and procedures that 
define and guide employee actions in handling corporate sensitive information 
(Purcell, n d). One such policy is the information security policy which is needed in 
an organisation so as to ensure efficient information security (Höne & J. Eloff, 2002). 
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An information security policy is a management approved document that provides 
rules for protecting the organisational information assets (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). 
Creating and communicating these policies to employees comprise an important first 
step in protecting corporate assets but the effort is of little value if employees do not 
adhere to the policies (Cisco, 2008).  
Various surveys have shown that employees do not always adhere to information 
security policies and that this gives rise to security breaches (Bean, 2006; Computer 
Security Institute, 2009; Ponemon Institute 2009; PWC, 2010a). Another survey 
conducted by PWC also showed that employees are the most likely source of 
information security incidents (PWC, 2010b). Non-adherence of employees to 
information security policies may be due to a variety of reasons, for example, they 
may not understand the risks posed by their behaviour; security is not a main 
concern or else they simply do not care (Cisco, 2008). 
Users are most likely to ignore or bypass security controls if these controls impact 
on their work, in which case employees will choose their own goals over the security 
goals (Beautement, Sasse, & Wonham, 2008; Besnard & Arief, 2004). According to 
Ponemon Larry, the chairman and founder of the Ponemon Institute, “employees are 
under tremendous pressure to be highly mobile and productive, but they aren't being 
properly educated on the risks to data integrity; they are taking data outside of the 
organisational structure without complete understanding or awareness of the serious 
implications of a breach or misuse of sensitive information” (Help Net Security, 
2009).  
It is, thus, essential that employees receive adequate education about security 
risks so that they may become security assets instead of vulnerabilities. Education, 
through user awareness programmes, will provide the employees with knowledge 
about information security risks although this does not necessarily guarantee that 
they will behave in a secure manner when carrying out their day to day activities. To 
this end most researchers suggest the fostering of a culture of information security or 
information security culture.  
Fostering an information security culture implies instilling security as a way of life 
and integrating security into the behaviour and attitudes of people so as to bring 
about a security conscious state (Ngo, Zhou, & Warren, 2005). In addition, it is 
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important that an information security culture is continuously maintained to ensure its 
continued consistency with the organisation’s goals and objectives. To this effect, it 
is necessary to assess the information security culture periodically. Information 
security culture may be regarded as a subculture of organisational culture 
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2002). Organisational culture is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Organisational culture 
People behave in certain ways depending on their knowledge, feelings or instincts 
(Tipton & Krause, 2007). Awareness programmes may provide knowledge to people 
but these programmes do not always influence their feelings about their obligations 
with regards to protecting information or their deeper security intuitions. This, in turn, 
may result in a gap between information security policy directives and people’s 
behaviour. For example, an employee opens an unanticipated email from a friend, 
either not worrying about the possibility of the attachment containing a virus or, 
possibly caring, but lacking sufficient “instinct” to identify the threat. However, this 
gap between the demands of information security policy and the behaviour of people 
may be closed by an effective organisational culture (Tipton & Krause, 2007). 
Culture belongs to a group and it may start to form in situations in which a group 
has sufficient common experience (Schein, 1999a) ). Every organisation has a 
certain culture that consists of a pervasive set of assumptions which is generally 
difficult to understand and which guides the activities within the organisation (Smit & 
Cronje, 1992). Culture plays various important roles within an organisation, for 
example, it helps to distinguish one organisation from another; it communicates a 
sense of identity to the members of the organisation; it enhances social system 
stability by holding the organisation together through the provision of suitable 
standards regarding what employees should say or do and it serves as a control 
mechanism to guide and shape employees’ attitudes and behaviour (Robbins, 1996). 
In addition, culture is a combined phenomenon that grows and changes over time. It 
may be influenced or designed by management (Schlienger & Teufel, 2002). 
There is no consensus about the definition of organisational culture. However, 
Schein’s model of culture is among the most widely discussed (Huczynski & 
Buchanan, 2007). According to Schein (1999a, p. 23), culture may be described as 
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“the sum total of all the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has 
learned throughout its history”. However, he warns that the greatest danger in 
understanding culture is trying to oversimplify it. This may be done by perceiving 
culture as “the way we do things around here” (Schein, 1999a, p. 19; 2009, p. 21). 
Another way in which to oversimplify culture is to maintain that it is “something” that 
makes one organisation more successful than the other (Smit & Cronje, 1992).  
It is difficult to transform culture because it represents the accrued learning of a 
group. It is the learned, shared and tacit assumptions on which people base their 
daily behaviour that drives the culture and it is what results in the perception that it is 
“the way we do things around here”(Schein, 1999a, p. 24). According to Schein 
(2009), the fact that culture is a complex concept is evident in its multi-facets while it 
is essential that every facet needs to be analysed if it is to be properly understood. 
These facets include the following: 
 Culture is deep – It is neither possible to manipulate culture easily nor 
to transform it at will. 
 Culture is broad – It may be an endless task trying to decipher culture. 
 Culture is stable – Culture provides meaning and makes life predictable 
as members of a group like to hold onto their cultural assumptions. 
Culture is regarded as one of the most stable aspects of an 
organisation.  
Culture exists in several “levels” with these levels ranging from the highly visible 
to the very tacit and invisible. Culture needs to be understood and managed (Schein, 
1999a). Figure 3.1 depicts the three levels of culture as described by Schein. These 
levels are discussed in the following subsections.  
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Artefacts
Espoused values
Shared tacit assumptions
Visible organisational structures and 
processes (hard to decipher)
Partially visible (espoused justifications)
Ultimate source of values and action
 
Figure 3.1 Levels of culture adapted from Schein (2009)  
 
3.3.1 Artefact level 
This is the visible layer ‒ the observable symbols and signs of an organisation’s 
culture (McShane & Von Glinow, 2005) This layer may be referred to as the surface 
manifestation of culture (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007) and comprises the 
phenomena that are observed within an organisation (Schein, 1999a; 2009). It 
includes visible organisational structures and processes. In addition, artefacts 
include the visible products and the visible and audible behaviour patterns within an 
organisation. 
The visible products include the physical environment and layout which, in turn, 
reveal significant insights into the corporate culture and its underlying values as well 
as appliances, clothes (company uniform), etc. Visible audible behaviour patterns 
include the rituals and ceremonies which contribute to an organisational culture by 
dramatizing the organisation’s basic values; organisational language which says 
much about the company’s culture and highlights the values held by the 
organisational subcultures; and heroes and heroines who transmit culture by 
personifying its corporate values (Gordon, 1996; McShane & Von Glinow, 2005) . 
These visible behaviours are made routine in the organisational processes (Zakaria, 
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Jarupunphol, & Gani, 2003). At this level, culture is clear and it has an immediate 
positive or negative emotional impact on the observer (Schein, 1999a; 2009). 
At the level of artefacts, it is difficult to decipher culture as observations of artefacts 
alone are unable to explain why members of an organisation behave in the way in 
which they do (Schein, 1999a; 2009). In order to understand why members of an 
organisation behave the way they do, it is necessary to question “insiders” within the 
organisation. This, in turn, leads on to the next level of culture (Schein, 1999a; 
2009). 
 
3.3.2 Espoused values level 
Espoused values are the “reasons” which an insider within the organisation would 
give for the observed artefacts (Schein, 1999a) ), for example, the fact that the 
organisation believes in teamwork or the fact that everyone’s view is important in the 
organisation. An organisation’s espoused values consists of the organisation’s 
strategies, goals and philosophies and other documents that describe the 
organisation’s values, principles, ethics and visions (Schein, 1999a). Espoused 
values are not directly visible. They are also generally unspoken but they may shape 
the behaviour of employees (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007). 
It is possible for two organisations to have the same espoused values but exhibit 
different observable artefacts (Schein, 1999a). In other words, espoused values are 
those elements that differentiate one organisation from other (Buchanan & 
Huczynski, 2004). This is as a result of a deeper level of thought and perception that 
is driving the observable behaviour and which may or may not be consistent with the 
principles and values espoused by the organisation (Schein, 1999a; 2009). In order 
to understand the culture, the deeper level (shared tacit assumptions) needs to be 
deciphered.  
 
3.3.3 Shared tacit assumptions level 
These shared tacit assumptions usually evolve in organisations that have been 
successful. They emanate from the values, beliefs and assumptions of the founders 
and key leaders of the organisation (Schein, 1999a). If the organisation continues to 
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be successful, the beliefs and values become shared and they are taken for granted. 
In fact, they become tacit assumptions about the nature of the world and how to be 
successful in the world (Schein, 1999a). These assumptions and beliefs comprise 
the core components of the organisational culture and they concern the nature of the 
people within the organisation, their behaviour and their relationship (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2002). The values, beliefs and assumptions which have become shared and 
which are taken for granted within an organisation form the core of that 
organisation’s culture. Beliefs in this context refer to a group of people’s convictions 
about the world and the way in which the world works while values relate to a 
community’s basic assumptions about the ideals which are worth following (Smit & 
Cronje, 1992). 
It is not possible to conceive of culture as being totally homogenous. With the 
growth and maturity of organisations, a culture develops as do subcultures. 
Subcultures exist in any culture and they stem from the frequent problems, situations 
or experiences encountered by members of the culture. These subcultures tend to 
be defined by departmental designations and geographical separation (Robbins, 
1996). Subcultures may also be based on occupations, product lines and levels of 
hierarchy (Schein, 2009). An organisational culture may include various subcultures 
based on sub-organisations or content with information security culture being a 
subculture with regards to content (Schlienger & Teufel, 2002). Information security 
culture exists in every organisation even if it is not recognised (ISACA, 2011). 
There is no “formal” definition for information security culture and, thus, the 
various ways in which it is defined in the field of information security will be explored 
in the next section. 
 
3.4 Information security culture  
Security does not lie in firewalls, passwords and awareness training only but also in a 
culture that perceives, thinks and feels in the correct way about information security 
issues. This may occur as the culture evolves into an information security learning 
organisation (Tipton & Krause, 2007). An information security learning organisation is 
“an organisation skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge about 
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information security and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new information security 
knowledge and insights” (Tipton & Krause, 2007, p. 558). However, if an organisation 
is to perceive, think and feel in the correct way about information security problems, 
then it is essential that a culture of information security be embedded into the 
organisational culture (Tipton & Krause, 2007). The security culture of an organisation 
may be perceived as the shared beliefs and attitudes of workers towards security 
goals and practices (Tipton & Krause, 2007). Without a culture of information security, 
policies and procedures will be ineffective in maintaining security. 
Several researchers have described information security culture in terms of 
culture levels or frameworks (Martins & J. Eloff, 2002b; Ruighaver, Maynard, & 
Chang, 2007; Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2006; Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 
2005). However, a few researchers only have provided a definition for information 
security culture. This may, in turn, be as a result of the complexity of information 
security culture (T. Kuusisto & Ilvonen, 2003; Ruighaver et al., 2007), while other 
researchers have alluded to the fact that there is no clear definition of information 
security culture (Maynard et al., 2002). The following section will explore the different 
ways in which researchers have defined information security culture. 
Martins and J. Eloff (2002a; 2002b) define information security culture as “the 
assumption about which type of information security behaviour is accepted and 
encouraged in order to incorporate information security characteristics as the way in 
which things are done in an organisation”. 
Information security culture may also be defined as “the attitudes, assumptions, 
beliefs, values and knowledge that employees/stakeholders use to interact with the 
organisation’s systems and procedures at any point in time. The interaction results in 
acceptable or unacceptable behaviour (i.e. incidents) evident in artefacts and 
creations that become part of the way things are done in the organisation to protect 
its information assets” (Da Veiga & J. Eloff, 2010). Information security culture 
transforms over time. 
According to Da Veiga and J. Eloff (2010), information security culture is based 
on the way in which employees interact with information assets and the security 
behaviour they display in the context of the organisational culture within the 
organisation. Information security culture may also be defined as “a pattern of 
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behaviours, beliefs, assumptions, attitudes and ways of doing things that promotes 
security” (ISACA, 2011, p. 17). 
However, other researchers have different views. Schlienger and Teufel (2002; 
2003a; 2003b) describe information security culture from the socio-cultural aspect of 
information security management. This is as a result of the fact that the human 
aspect of information security culture is generally ignored and the emphasis is on 
technical measures that perceive the users as threats to information security. B. Von 
Solms (2000) refers to the technical approach to information security as the first 
wave ‒ the technical wave. The researchers, Schlienger and Teufel (2002; 2003a; 
2003b), suggest a paradigm shift from a technical to a human-centric focus ‒ from 
“the user is my enemy” to “my user is my security asset”. This involves developing 
an information security culture by inculcating the aspects of information security in all 
employees as a natural way of carrying out their daily jobs or, in other words, as a 
component of the third wave ‒ institutionalisation (B. Von Solms, 2000).  
According to Schlienger and Teufel (2002; 2003a; 2003b), information security 
culture is a subculture of organisational culture comprising all the socio-cultural 
measures that support the technical measures in such a way that information 
security culture becomes a natural feature in the day to day activities of each 
employee. Ngo et al. (2005), on the other hand, define information security culture as 
the activities carried out by employees and the organisation as a whole in relation to 
information security. Other definitions of information security culture refer to it as a 
complex system comprising an interacting framework and a content component and 
which is developed over time by transforming the behaviour within an organisation in 
the desired direction (Kuusisto, Nyberg, & Virtanen, 2004). Information security 
culture may also be defined as “the totality of patterns of behaviour in an 
organisation that contribute to the protection of information of all kinds” (Dhillon, 
1997, p. 59).  
Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010) define information security culture by 
adapting the culture levels of Schein to include a fourth level, namely, information 
security knowledge which affects the other three levels of Schein’s organisational 
culture. Information security knowledge is necessary if employees are to behave in a 
secure manner as it may not be taken for granted that the employees possess the 
requisite knowledge to carry out their jobs in a secure way. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
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information security culture model of Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms (2010) and is 
further explained below. 
 
Information security knowledge
 (what to do, how to do it and why it 
should be done)
Artefacts
Espoused values
Shared tacit assumptions
Visible organisational structures and 
processes (hard to decipher)
i i l  r i ti l tr t r   
r  ( r  t  i r)
Partially visible (espoused justifications)rti ll  i i l  (  j tifi ti )
Ultimate source of values and actionlti t  r  f l   ti
 
Figure 3.2 Information security culture adapted from Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010) 
 
3.4.1 Artefact level 
This level was referred to in section 3.3.1 as the visible layer. In terms of information 
security artefacts comprise the visible and measurable everyday behaviour within an 
organisation (Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2005). Artefacts include behaviour 
patterns, security handbooks, information security policy documents, awareness 
courses, language and technology.  
 
3.4.2 Espoused values level 
As referred to in section 3.3.2 this level is both partially visible and unspoken but, 
nevertheless, it may shape the behaviour of employees (Huczynski & Buchanan, 
2007). In terms of information security the espoused values of an organisation 
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include strategies, goals, philosophies and other documents, for example, an 
information security policy that describe the values, principles and vision of the 
organisation (Schein, 2009). 
 
3.4.3 Shared tacit assumptions level 
As referred to in section 3.3.3 shared tacit assumptions usually form in organisations 
that have been successful and where the success of the organisation may be 
attributed to the values, beliefs and assumptions of the founders of the organisation 
(Schein, 2009). If the organisation continues to be successful, the beliefs and values 
become shared and are taken for granted, forming the core of the organisation’s 
culture (Schein, 1999a). 
 
3.4.4 Information security knowledge  
This level supports the other three levels: 1) artefacts (it is essential that employees 
are equipped with adequate information security knowledge of how to carry out their 
job functions in a secure manner), 2) espoused values (the relevant employees need 
to be equipped with sufficient information security knowledge to enable them to know 
what to incorporate into a policy document, for example, to ensure that the policy 
document adequately addresses the security needs of the organisation), and 3) 
shared tacit assumptions (if an employee’s beliefs conflict with an espoused value, 
for example, not knowing why a specific control is required, the employee may 
knowingly disregard the security control). Thus, knowledge may help to ensure 
compliance with the information security policy (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003b). 
For the purposes of this research study the definition of information security 
culture as suggested by Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010) will be adopted.  
From the above discussion, it is evident that various researchers define 
information security culture in different ways. However, no matter the way in which it 
is either defined or described, it is clear that information security culture is important 
within an organisation and, therefore, that it needs to be established and fostered in 
an organisation in order to ensure effective information security (M. Eloff & S. Von 
Solms, 2000; B. Von Solms, 2000). By establishing and fostering information security 
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culture within an organisation, information security becomes an integral part of the 
routine actions of every employee (Thomson et al., 2006b; Vroom & R. Von Solms, 
2004). The next section explores the fostering of information security culture.  
 
3.5 Fostering information security culture 
Fostering means to encourage or promote the development of something 
(Dictionary.com, n d). Thus, fostering an information security culture entails 
encouraging or promoting its development. Various researchers have used different 
synonyms to refer to the fostering of an information security culture; including 
cultivating, stimulating, supporting, improving and changing the existing culture to 
become a more security aware culture. However, before something can be promoted 
or cultivated, it must first be established or created. Accordingly, the next section will 
focus on the way in which an information security culture may be created within an 
organisation. 
 
3.5.1 Creating an information security culture 
According to Schlienger and Teufel (2003a; 2003b), it is not possible to establish an 
information security culture just once and then use it for the rest of time. On the 
contrary, it needs to be created, maintained or changed continuously to ensure that it 
remains consistent with the goals or objectives of the organisation concerned. Ngo et 
al. (2005) support the institutionalisation of information security culture. This, in turn, 
entails creating, fostering and maintaining the information security culture. Ngo et al. 
(2005) attribute the creation or establishment of an information security culture to 
mean a change in the current state of culture to a more security conscious culture 
and this may involve transforming the behaviour and attitudes of people with regards 
to information security awareness. Other researchers also support the creation of an 
information security culture to help organisations to influence employee behaviour in 
such as a way as to ensure the improved protection of organisational assets (Da 
Veiga & J. Eloff, 2010; Ruighaver et al., 2007; Thomson et al., 2006a).  
Factors that may contribute to the establishment or creation of an information 
security culture include information security awareness and training, information 
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security ownership (roles and responsibilities), top management support for 
information security, an information security policy, incident management, an 
information security budget and human resource (HR) management and practices 
(Alnatheer, Chan, & Nelson, 2012; ISACA, 2011). By establishing an organisational 
information security culture, the “my own user is my biggest enemy” syndrome will 
be addressed as employees become security assets instead of risks (B. Von Solms, 
2000). B. Von Solms (2000) also supports the embedding of information security into 
the organisational culture which is needed for effective information security. 
Woodhouse (2007) also supports the notion of embedding information security into 
organisational culture in order to ensure the successful securing of organisational 
information assets. With information security entrenched in an organisation, 
employees adhere to the guidelines of the organisation routinely and unquestioningly 
(Thomson et al., 2006b; Vroom & R. Von Solms, 2004). The entrenchment of 
information security into organisational culture refers to the “information security 
mode” in terms of which employees adhere to information security policies without 
being monitored (Alfawaz, Nelson, & Mohannak, 2010). Fostering information 
security culture within an organisation brings with it various benefits such as trust, 
consistency, standards, improved ability to manage risk, improved return on security 
investment, compliance with laws and regulations and shareholder/citizen value 
(ISACA, 2011). These benefits are discussed below. 
 Trust ‒ From a business perspective, trust refers to a firmly fixed assuredness 
that a person/thing is what he/she/it claims to be and which enables the 
smooth running of organisations (ISACA, 2011). If a culture promotes security 
this subsequently leads to dependable expectations in the decisions being 
made with regards to information. In other words, a culture of security or an 
information security culture ensures reliability/trust which may be either 
internal or external to the organisation concerned (ISACA, 2011). 
 Consistency ‒ Consistent security results from a culture that uses the same 
procedures in the same manner at all times in respect of all assets of 
comparable value (ISACA, 2011). Predictability, which is a by-product of 
consistency, refers to a reasonable expectation that the same process, tool or 
measure will give the same results all the time (ISACA, 2011). An 
organisation with a predictable security culture is able to anticipate risks 
upfront and implement procedures to avert these risks in a proactive manner. 
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 Standards ‒ Standards contribute to a culture of security which may, in turn, 
be either internal or external. External standards have an added benefit of 
certification which promotes a culture of security and builds internal support 
(ISACA, 2011). 
 Improved ability to manage risk ‒ Risk exists in every organisation and may 
be addressed by means of a risk management process. A culture of security 
creates a receptive environment for understanding and dealing with all forms 
of risk (ISACA, 2011).  
 Improved return on security investment (ROSI) ‒ The benefit of ROSI in a 
culture of security is the creation of an environment within an organisation that 
enables the determination of the correct mix of investments, whether security 
products, insurance or the acceptance of costs incurred as a result of security 
related incidents (ISACA, 2011). 
 Compliance with laws and regulations ‒ According to ISACA (2011), a culture 
of security enables an organisation to comply with laws and regulations and 
make compliance an integral part of routine operations.  
 Stakeholder/citizen value ‒ According to ISACA (2011), organisations with a 
culture of security provide greater value to their stakeholders or citizens in 
terms of profits and mission undertakings. A culture of security enables 
stakeholders, investors and employees of all levels to see the alignment of 
business and security goals (ISACA, 2011).  
In order to realise the above benefits, it is essential that certain challenges be 
overcome. These challenges include the information security culture not comprising 
an integral part of the organisational culture, an inability to obtain the requisite 
budget for security activities, a small group of people only being responsible for 
implementing information security measures, a lack of organisational motivation with 
regards to implementing security measures and a lack of management support. 
These challenges are discussed below. 
 Not an integral part of the organisational culture ‒ According to Knapp, 
Marshall, Rainer, and Ford (2006), information security is not an integral part 
of most organisational culture. Employees tend to treat information security as 
an inconvenience and they often oppose new policies and related controls.  
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 Inability to obtain the requisite budget ‒ A number of researchers agree about 
the difficulty of obtaining the requisite budget for information security activities, 
including the training of employees and the implementation of technical 
controls and the funds required to enable teams in the assessment of network 
security (Lim, Ahmad, Chang, & Maynard, 2010; Martins & J. Eloff, 2002a; 
2002c; Shedden, Ahmad, & Ruighaver, 2006).  
 Locus of responsibility ‒ According to Lim, Maynard, and Ahmad (2009), 
information security measures are often implemented by a small number of 
people only. Chia, Maynard, and Ruighaver (2002) also found evidence to 
suggest that a small number of people only execute information security 
measures involving planning, managing and implementing security. It is 
essential that the information security policy clearly delineate the 
responsibilities of everyone in the organisation in order to protect 
organisational information (Doherty & Fulford, 2006).  
 Organisational motivation ‒ Organisations often lack motivation in respect of 
the implementation of security measures with organisations being forced to 
comply with external audit and government regulations rather than believing in 
the importance of security practices in safeguarding organisational 
information. Consequently, the implementation of security policies may be the 
result of external requirements instead of a belief in the importance of security 
practices. This, in turn, may cause employees to oppose new policies and 
related controls as they may regard information security as a problem 
(Maynard & Ruighaver, 2006). 
 Management support ‒ According to Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010), 
top management support is essential in implementing information security 
practices. Other researchers also allude to the fact that senior management 
involvement is required both to ensure that employees adhere to security 
policies and procedures and to promote security consciousness amongst 
users (D'Arcy & Greene, 2009; Hone & J. Eloff, 2002). 
The fostering of an information security culture follows the creation of the 
information security culture. The methods which may be used to foster information 
security culture are discussed in the next section. 
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3.5.2 Methods to foster an information security culture 
Fostering information security culture involves instilling security as a way of life as 
well as integrating security into the behaviour and attitudes of people in respect of a 
security conscious state (Ngo et al., 2005). In so doing, the organisational culture 
should be taken into account to ensure that the most suitable controls are 
recognised and utilised successfully (Da Veiga & J. Eloff, 2010). According to R. Von 
Solms and B. Von Solms (2004), an appropriate organisational culture should be 
cultivated in order to ensure that employees behave in a way that fulfils 
management’s vision as specified in the company policies. 
A number of researchers have proposed various methods to foster information 
security culture within an organisation including (Alnatheer & Nelson, 2009; 
Buchanan & Huczynski, 2004; Da Veiga & J. Eloff, 2010; Dojkovski, Lichtenstein, & 
Warren, 2010; D'Arcy & Greene, 2009; M. Eloff & S. Von Solms, 2000; Fourie, 2003; 
Gebrasilase & Lessa, 2011; Hone & J. Eloff, 2002; ISO/IEC 27002, 2005a; 
Karabacak & Sogukpinar, 2006; Knapp et al., 2006; Kraemer & Carayon, 2005; Lim 
et al, 2010; Martins & J. Eloff, 2002a; Maynard et al., 2002; Ngo et al., 2005; 
Nosworthy, 2000; OECD, 2002; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003a; Sims, 1999; Thomson & 
R. Von Solms, 2005; Thomson et al., 2006a; Trompeter & J. Eloff, 2001; Van 
Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2005; B. Von Solms, 2000; R. Von Solms & B. Von Solms, 
2004). Table 3.1 summarises the various methods which may be used to foster an 
information security culture, including top management support, information security 
compliance, information security risk analysis, information security awareness and 
training, information security management standardisation and best practices, 
information security policy, organisational culture and ethical conduct. 
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Table 3.1 Methods to foster an information security culture 
METHOD DESCRIPTION 
Top management support Top management support is seen as the most important factor affecting information security management activities in an 
organisation. It is necessary in order to promote suitable information security activities such as information security training and 
awareness programmes. It is essential that managers act as role models for employees both by showing an interest in 
information security and by adhering to information security policies. Their commitment is vital in promoting compliant and 
proactive security conscious users. 
Information security compliance Information security compliance processes assist organisations to compare their actual information security operations with 
international information security standards. In addition, they assess and audit the disparity between the expected standards of 
the organisational state and the reality within the organisation. By assessing the degree of compliance, organisations are able to 
determine their degree of conformity to the controls listed in the standards. Organisations that are security aware have high 
compliance levels which, in turn, lead to an improved information security policy which may help to foster information security 
culture. 
Information security risk analysis Information security risk is “the potential that a threat will exploit a vulnerability of an asset or group of assets and, thereby, cause 
harm to the organisation” (ISO/IEC 27000, 2009, p. 4). Risk analysis, which is a part of risk assessment, is “the systematic use of 
information to identify sources and to estimate the risk” (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005b, p. 2). By performing a risk analysis, 
organisational assets, threats to the assets and security controls may be identified and an information security policy formulated 
which will help the organisation to integrate the needed information security culture into its organisational culture. 
Information security awareness and 
training programmes 
Information security awareness and training programmes address the way in which employees attain an understanding of a 
suitable information security culture which may be achieved through education and training. Information security awareness, 
education and training programmes help employees to become conscious of information security policies and procedures and, 
thus, to equip and enable them to behave in a responsible and secure manner. Information security awareness programmes 
should include the use of posters, mouse pads and pens with security slogans to help ensure that the topic of security is ever 
present. 
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METHOD DESCRIPTION 
Information security management 
standardisation and best practices 
Information security management standards such as ISO 27002, COBIT and ITIL are used to estimate and maintain a secure 
environment for information and they may influence the culture of security within an organisation. These standards enable top 
management to monitor and control security, reduce the risks to the business and ensure that security continues to fulfil 
corporate, customer and legal requirements. Information security standards provide organisations with a baseline code of 
practice and, by following this baseline code, an organisation will be assured of addressing most of the security needs of the 
organisation as well as to meeting international standards. Benchmarking may also influence employee behaviour positively by 
incorporating guidelines on information security processes such as awareness and training programmes into the organisation.  
Information security policy Information security policy provides management with direction and support in respect of information security in keeping with 
business requirements as well as relevant laws and regulations. The policy stipulates how employees should behave and states 
what is expected of them; this will, in time, become part of the information security culture. An information security culture may be 
cultivated through an information security policy, as employee behaviour may be influenced if the organisational information 
security policy is in line with the organisational culture.  
Organisational culture An organisation’s culture focuses on the values, beliefs and meanings that its members use to understand how the uniqueness 
of the organisation begins, develops and operates. Organisational culture is a combined phenomenon that grows and transforms 
over time although it may be controlled or designed by management. The behaviour of employees is determined by the 
organisational culture. Organisational culture should be considered when developing an information security culture to ensure 
sure that the most suitable controls are identified and utilised successfully. 
Ethical conduct Ethical behaviour or conduct may be referred to as that which is morally accepted as “good” and “right” as opposed to “bad” or 
“wrong” in a particular setting. The ethical climate of an organisation is established at the top and comprises the shared set of 
understandings about what correct behaviour is and how ethical issues are addressed. The OECD guidelines propose that 
organisations develop and follow best practices and encourage conduct that recognises security needs. It is essential that 
employees include ethical conduct or behaviour relating to information security into their routine life within the organisation. By 
enforcing ethical conduct within the organisation, the correct information security culture will evolve in time. 
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The next section discusses the process to foster an information security culture. 
 
3.5.3 Process to foster an information security culture 
Change is an integral part of life and organisations are subject to change as a result 
of the rapid changes in the external environment. Organisations have to change in 
order to survive and, thus, the challenge is not about whether to change but how to 
change to ensure organisational effectiveness. If not managed properly 
organisational change may fail. This failure may sometimes be attributed to the 
neglect of organisational culture. The culture of an organisation, if managed well, 
may constitute a competitive advantage and, therefore, it becomes vital that 
organisations manage the change process at the cultural level (Cameron & Quinn, 
2011). 
In view of the difficulty involved in changing the beliefs, values and principles of 
employees, Schein (1999a) proposes a structured change management process to 
facilitate the fostering of an information security culture change in the organisation. 
Figure 3.3 depicts an eight step culture change process as adapted from Van 
Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2005). This process includes top management support 
and commitment, defining a specific business problem, developing a strategic action 
plan, creating a cultural fit, developing and choosing a change leader team, creating 
small wins, identifying metrics, measures and milestones and reviewing and refining. 
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Top management support & 
commitment 
(information security vision)
Define specific business problem
Repeat for each business problem
Assess current state Define preferred future 
state
Culture gap analysis
(Determine steps from 
current to preferred state)
Develop strategic action 
plan
Create cultural fit
Develop and choose a 
change leader team
Create small wins
Identify metrics, measures 
& milestones
Review & refine
 
Figure 3.3 A framework for culture change adapted from Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms 
(2005) 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the eight step culture change process. The summary is 
based on scrutiny of the following literature: (Alpander & Lee, 1995; Broome, 1998; 
Cameron & Quinn, 2011; ISACA, 2011; “ISO 27001 security,” n d; ISO/IEC 27000, 
2009; Katzenbach & Douglas, 1993; Mento, Jones, & Dirndorfer, 2002; O'Donovan, 
2006; Sadri & Lees, 2001; Schein, 1999a; 1999b; 2002; 2009; 2010; Van Niekerk & 
R. Von Solms, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2003). 
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Table 3.2 Eight-step culture change process 
Step 1: Establish top management support and commitment 
Top management support and 
commitment 
Any culture change process has to start with top management 
support if it is to be successful. Top management should set the 
tone from the top in terms of establishing an information security 
culture. Management should, thus, enforce an information security 
culture through ways such as the development of visionary 
statements and information security policies and procedures.  
Step 2: Define specific business problem 
Specific business problem Culture change should be carried out within a specific business 
context. The current state of information security culture should be 
known in terms of the specific business context. Defining the 
problem in a specific business context involves three stages, 
namely, assess the current state, define the preferred future state 
and analyse the culture gap. 
Assess the current state Assessing the current state or the existing culture is the first step in 
the development of the desired information security culture. The 
current state should be assessed in terms of the four underlying 
levels of information security culture, namely, artefacts, espoused 
values, shared tacit assumptions and information security 
knowledge. 
Define the preferred future 
state 
The preferred future state should be defined in terms of the four 
underlying levels of information security culture. Resources such as 
annual reports, induction courses and company advertisements 
may be used to assist in the development of a profile of the desired 
or ideal culture. 
Culture gap analysis A culture gap analysis should be conducted using both the 
ideal/preferred culture profile and the prevailing/existing culture 
profile as input while the output is a map of the gap between the 
vision and the reality. Based on the gap analysis a decision should 
be made regarding the changes which should be involved in moving 
from the existing to the preferred culture. The degree of change and 
effort required will vary across all the underlying levels of the 
information security culture. The steps needed to move from the 
current state to the preferred state would follow a transformative 
change management process involving unfreezing (creating the 
motivation for change), learning (learning new concepts and new 
meanings for old concepts), and refreezing (internalising the new 
concepts and new meanings). 
Step 3: Develop strategic action plan 
Strategic action plan Strategic action plans should be developed for achieving the 
desired information security culture. For example, the identification 
of actions and behaviours that should be initiated stopped or 
encouraged in an effort to promote the type of behaviour that aligns 
with the desired culture.  
Step 4: Create a cultural fit 
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Cultural fit Embedding mechanisms such as education and training and 
appraisal and reward systems should be used to help ensure that 
the changes are embedded into the existing culture and that they 
last. 
Step 5: Develop and choose a change leader team 
A change leader team It is essential that a change leader team be chosen that is 
committed and competent and which has a common purpose in 
order to facilitate the change. A team with diverse skills and 
opinions but which shares the same vision will contribute to the 
strength of the team. 
Step 6: Create small wins 
Small wins It is important to identify key action steps that may be executed to 
generate momentum. Such small actions must be aligned to the 
desired culture change in order to motivate employees. 
Step 7: Identify metrics, measures and milestones 
Metrics, measures and 
milestones 
Culture change should be personalised while accountability for 
progress should be maintained. It is important to identify measures 
for success, metrics of the main indicators and milestones in order 
to track the progress of the change. As the change process 
progresses it may be necessary to reassess the current state 
following the results emanating from tracking the change process. 
Step 8: Review and refine 
Review and refine An organisational environment changes frequently as a result of 
both internal and external factors and so do the organisation’s 
needs. For example, there could be a change of management or a 
new government regulation in terms of security thereby changing 
the organisational environment and the organisational security 
needs. Thus, it becomes necessary to review and refine the entire 
information security culture management process periodically to 
ensure that the organisation’s information security culture is 
managed on an on-going basis and the organisation’s security 
needs are met.  
 
Having discussed the process involved in fostering an information security 
culture, the next section will discuss the assessment of information security culture. 
 
3.6 Assessment of information security culture 
It is evident from the eight-step culture change process discussed in section 3.5.3 
that assessment plays an important role in the culture change process. The next 
section examines the role of assessment in culture change. 
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3.6.1 The role of assessment in information security culture change 
Assessment plays an important role in the fostering of an information security 
culture. Culture is a complex, extensive and multifaceted concept that needs to be 
analysed and assessed at each level in order for it to be understood (Schein, 2009). 
The complexity of culture is manifest in the mission, vision, strategy and goals of the 
organisation (external survival issues) and in the relationships amongst the people 
within the organisation (internal integration issues). These are also correlated to the 
broader national cultural assumptions arising from organisations becoming global.  
Culture assessment could be used to solve a business problem, enhance 
efficiency or realise a new strategic goal possibly arising from mergers, joint ventures 
or partnerships incorporating more than one culture (Schein, 2009). According to 
Schein (2009), the assessment of culture plays an important role in the fostering of 
an information security culture. In addition, it helps an organisation to understand its 
own culture in terms of strengths and weaknesses and assists in the making of 
strategic choices. Consequently, a culture assessment enables an organisation to 
solve a problem, to make a change and to learn something new. However, in order 
to do this, an organisation needs to be aware of the way in which the culture or 
subculture may either be a help or a hindrance. 
According to O'Donovan (2006), culture change exists in response to both 
internal and external forces in the environment. Internal forces include technology, 
policies, leadership changes, absenteeism, and rapid staff turnover while external 
forces include political, economic, environmental and regulatory forces. These forces 
may, in turn, necessitate the assessment of the culture. For example, a new chief 
executive officer/chief security officer may have a new security vision that may 
necessitate the assessment of the information security culture to ensure that it is in 
alignment with the new security vision. As explained, one of the reasons for a culture 
assessment is to solve a “business problem”. One such problem may be information 
security that necessitates a culture assessment in order to identify possible 
improvements to the security policy. A culture assessment may also arise as a result 
of organisations having to comply with regulatory and/or legal requirements and/or 
standards, including the following: 
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 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
which deals with the protection of personal healthcare information which is 
either stored or in transit within or outside of the organisation (Tipton & 
Krause, 2007). 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which requires organisations to certify the 
adequacy of their internal controls independently (Tipton & Krause, 2008). 
 The ISO 27001 which stipulates the requirements for implementing security 
controls to meet the needs of every organisation (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005).  
Culture assessments also assist an organisation to identify the current and the 
desired information security culture, the areas that require the most attention as well 
as the improvements needed to achieve the desired information security culture 
(Ngo, Zhou, Chonka, & Singh, 2009). Another reason for an information security 
culture assessment would be to help an organisation to understand the behaviour of 
its employees in respect of information security and to identify key issues which 
should be implemented and integrated into the information security culture of the 
organisation (Gebrasilase & Lessa, 2011). The assessment of the information 
security culture may also serve as a “wake-up” call for management, depending on 
the results of the assessment and, thus, act as a spur to management to take 
decisive action (ISACA, 2011). 
Having highlighted the importance of assessment in fostering an information 
security culture, it is necessary to discuss approaches that may be used in the 
assessment of information security culture.  
 
3.6.2 Current assessment approaches to information security culture 
A number of research studies were identified in the literature reviewed that focus on 
the assessment of information security culture within an organisation. Table 3.3 
presents this information. The first column lists the research approaches in 
alphabetical order, the second column indicates whether the research approach 
focuses on the assessment of information security culture while the third column 
indicates whether the research approach describes a process for the assessment of 
information security culture. A tick () indicates a yes and a cross (X) indicates a no. 
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Table 3.3 Research approaches to the assessment of information security culture 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
FOCUS ON ASSESSMENT OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
CULTURE 
DESCRIBE A PROCESS FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY CULTURE 
1 Finch, Furnell and 
Dowland (2003) 
  X 
2 Gebrasilase and Lessa 
(2011) 
                 X 
3 Martins and J. Eloff 
(2002a, 2003b) 
    
4 Maynard et al. (2002) 
  
X 
 
5 Ngo et al. (2009) 
  
X 
 
6 Schlienger and Teufel 
(2002; 2003a; 2003b; 
2005) 
    
 
The next paragraph provides a high level overview of each of the above research 
approaches. 
 Finch et al. (2003) assessed information security culture by targeting the 
security attitudes and perceptions of system administrators and end-users to 
ascertain whether there were any disparities between the two perspectives. 
 Gebrasilase and Lessa (2011) used a descriptive survey method for the 
assessment of information security culture in the Hawassa referral hospital.  
 Martins and J. Eloff (2002) used an assessment approach comprising an audit 
process and including an information security culture questionnaire for the 
assessment of the information security culture within an organisation.  
 Maynard et al. (2002) developed a research model for information security 
culture which may be used to assess the quality of an organisation’s 
information security culture.  
 Ngo et al. (2009) discussed the way in which the level of information security 
culture in small and medium enterprises in Australia may be assessed.  
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 Schlienger and Teufel (2003a; 2003b; 2005) used an information security 
culture management process incorporating a combination of methods for the 
assessment and management of information security culture.  
This research study will focus only on the two assessment approaches that 
describe a process for the assessment of information security culture in an 
organisation as depicted in table 3.3, namely, the approach of Martins and J. Eloff 
(2002a, 2002b) which is next in section 3.6.2.1 and the approach of Schlienger and 
Teufel (2005) which is described in section 3.6.2.2.  
 
3.6.2.1 The assessment approach of Martins & Eloff  
Martins and J. Eloff, (2002a) argue that employees’ behaviour and their interaction 
with computer systems play a major role in the security of information. They maintain 
that it is essential that employees display acceptable behaviour with regards to 
information security and that this should translate into their everyday activity within 
the organisation. 
They suggest that organisational behaviour needs to be taken into account in the 
development of the desired organisational culture. They propose incorporating 
organisational behaviour theory in order to instil an information security culture. This 
may be done through the development of an information security culture model 
consisting of three levels, namely, organisation, group and individual. They identified 
certain issues at each level that may promote an information security culture. These 
issues (i.e. policy and procedures, risk analysis at the organisational level, 
management and trust at the group level and awareness and ethical conduct at the 
individual level) are affected by change agents, namely, technology or competition to 
achieve a certain information security culture. 
In order to determine whether the information security culture is at an acceptable 
level within an organisation, the researchers propose an assessment approach 
consisting of an audit process. The assessment approach aims to determine 
employees’ perceptions, attitudes, opinions and actions with regards to information 
security. Based on the analysis of the information gathered throughout the audit, 
organisations may address information security culture issues at the three different 
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levels, namely, organisation, group and individual. The audit process consists of the 
following four phases: 
1. Development of the assessment instrument (questionnaire). 
2. A survey process that utilises the questionnaire from phase one in order to 
assess the organisation’s information security culture.  
3. An analysis of data obtained from phase two in order to be able to provide a 
quantitative indication of the status of information security culture within the 
organisation. 
4. Interpretations and recommendations concerning the data analysed in phase 
three. This step provides feedback to the organisation regarding its 
information security culture and to assist the organisation in addressing areas 
of concern. 
 
3.6.2.2 The assessment approach of Schlienger and Teufel 
It is essential that the information security culture is maintained and modified on an 
on-going basis to ensure that it meets the organisation’s targets (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2003b). This on-going process of analysis and change, which is referred to 
as the information security culture management process, involves four stages, 
namely, diagnosis, planning, implementation and evaluation: 
1. The diagnosis stage entails the analysis the existing information security 
culture and identifies any problems.  
2. The planning stage involves two aspects. The first aspect comprises strategic 
planning which, in turn, involves defining the target or objective of the 
development of the information security culture (i.e. information security 
policy).The second aspect comprises operative planning which involves 
internal communication in terms of awareness programmes, training, 
education and management buy-in in order to promote the security 
awareness of employees and managers. 
3. The implementation stage involves management commitment, communication 
with all employees, education and training for all employees and employee 
commitment. During this stage detailed activities, responsibilities, resources, 
schedules and a budget are defined (Schlienger & Teufel, 2005). 
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4. The evaluation stage provides information regarding the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the actions which have been implemented. 
The researchers used a combination of methods in order to assess information 
security culture. They started by analysing the information security policy in order to 
understand the official values (espoused values). Their interpretation of these official 
values was validated by interviewing the chief security officer (CSO). An analysis of 
the security policy also formed part of the assessment of the artefacts. The 
researchers devised a questionnaire to determine the perceptions and attitudes of 
employees (true values), the perceptions and attitudes of the organisation (official 
values) and what the employees believed would be the best answer to each 
question. Unstructured interviews were conducted with the CSO and a technician 
responsible for security. Firstly, interviews were conducted before analysing the 
security policy in order to obtain an insight of the organisation’s information security. 
Secondly, interviews were conducted after analysing the security policy in order to 
be able to discuss and interpret the issues identified in the questionnaire. Interviews 
were also conducted after the results of the questionnaire had been analysed in 
order to discuss the quality of the answers given by respondents. Observation was 
also carried out as part of assessing the artefacts by comparing the respondents’ 
answers with their behaviour. 
The two assessment approaches discussed in section 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2 have 
positive contributions but this research study focuses on what is lacking in the 
current assessment approaches. Thus, the next section provides a discussion of the 
limitations of the two assessment approaches discussed in section 3.6.2.1 and 
3.6.2.2. 
 
3.6.3 Discussion of the limitations of the two assessment approaches 
Both assessment approaches used a questionnaire to assess the shared tacit 
assumptions. The following include some of the considerations regarding the use of 
a questionnaire to assess information security culture as found in the literature 
(Janićijević, 2011; Schein, 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003a; Yauch & Steudel, 
2003).  
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 The dimensions of culture selected for assessment may not be important in 
relation to the cultural dynamics of the specific organisation.  
 The respondents may understand and interpret the questions in different ways 
and, thus, the interpretation of the questions and the reasoning behind the 
respondents’ answers are not explored. This, in turn, makes it difficult to 
conclude that the respondents interpreted the questions correctly.  
 Using a questionnaire to assess culture does not reveal the interaction and 
patterning in the cultures and subcultures. 
 Superficial characteristics of the culture only will be assessed because it is not 
possible for survey instruments to reach the deeper shared tacit assumptions 
that define the essence of cultures. 
 The use of questionnaires may be rigid as important issues relating to culture 
may be neglected in view of the fact that the questions focus on preconceived 
concepts, thus resulting in an inaccurate, incomplete and illusory picture of 
the culture concerned. 
 Questionnaires do not take into account the history and context of culture 
since they provide a snapshot of the culture only. 
Other limitations of the two assessment approaches include the following: 
Schlienger and Teufel interviewed the chief security officer (CSO) only and this 
may have resulted in a biased assessment as the CSO’s view may not necessarily 
be a true reflection of the state of information security within the organisation. 
Martins and J. Eloff did not discuss any direct assessment of artefacts and 
espoused values. While Schlienger and Teufel did not assess information security 
knowledge, Martins and J. Eloff did, indeed, assess information security knowledge 
but not comprehensively. Both assessment approaches used an auditing process in 
their assessments but they did not explicitly state that formal auditing guidelines or 
framework had been used. 
According to Schein (2009), culture should be assessed across all levels. Table 
3.4 summarises the way in which the above researchers assessed the information 
security culture within an organisation. The aim is to determine whether the 
researchers assessed the four levels of information security culture. The table 
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includes the assessment item (level assessed) and also the assessment method(s) 
used for each level by the researchers. 
 
Table 3.4 Research approach, assessment items and methods per level of information 
security culture 
Assessment item 
Assessment 
method 
Research approach 
Martins and Eloff Schlienger and Teufel 
Artefacts 
Document 
analysis 
None 
Analysis of information security 
policy 
Interview None Interview with CSO only 
Observation None 
Audit with no formal auditing 
guidelines or procedures 
Espoused values 
Document 
analysis 
None 
Analysis of information security 
policy 
Questionnaire No direct assessment 
Questioning of all levels of 
employees 
Interview None Interview with CSO only 
Shared tacit 
assumptions 
Questionnaire 
Questioning of all 
levels of employees 
Questioning of all levels of 
employees 
Interview None Interview with CSO only 
Information 
security 
knowledge 
Questionnaire 
Few questions on 
information security 
knowledge 
No direct assessment 
 
It may be concluded from table 3.4 that shared tacit assumptions were addressed 
extensively by both assessment approaches. However, the assessment of artefacts, 
espoused values and information security knowledge was lacking. Auditing was 
utilised although no formal auditing guidelines or framework were used. This 
Page | 55  
 
research study proposes that the use of a formal information systems (IS) control 
framework as an integrated IS auditing and process approach may play a role in the 
assessment of all the levels of information security culture. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the topic of information security culture. The chapter 
commenced with background information on the subject of information as a vital 
organisational asset and the need to protect information (information security) in 
order to ensure its CIA. The chapter further discussed the management of 
information security and the challenges faced by management in achieving the 
protection of information. Included in these challenges is the concept of the “human 
factor” in terms of which employees bypass security controls, thus causing security 
breaches.  
It was acknowledged that educating employees by way of awareness 
programmes would succeed in equipping them with knowledge about security risks 
only. However, this would not guarantee that the employees would translate this 
knowledge into action and behave in a secure manner in the course of performing 
their job functions. This, in turn, has led several researchers to suggest fostering of a 
culture. 
Organisational culture was discussed using Schein’s model which is widely 
accepted in the field of information security. Schein suggested that there are three 
levels of culture, namely, artefacts which is the visible layer, consisting of visible 
organisational structures and processes and which are difficult to interpret, the 
espoused values, which are not directly visible and which differentiate one 
organisation from the other, and the shared tacit assumptions, which are the ultimate 
source of values and actions and which comprise the underlying beliefs and values 
of the people within the organisation. 
The concept of subcultures was introduced with information security culture 
as a subculture of organisational culture. Information security culture was discussed 
as well as the various ways in which various researchers have defined the concept in 
order to address the first sub question, namely: How is information security culture 
defined in the field of information security? 
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Special reference was made to the way in which Schein’s model of culture has 
been adapted to include fourth level ‒ information security knowledge. This was 
important since it must not be taken for granted that employees possess the security 
related knowledge required for performing their daily tasks in a secure manner. 
The fostering of information security culture was discussed, including how 
information security culture may be created, the challenges and benefits involved in 
fostering information security culture as well as the methods and the process in 
terms of which to foster information security culture in order to address the second 
sub-question, namely: How may information security culture be fostered within an 
organisation? 
The assessment of information security culture was discussed, including the role 
of assessment in culture change as well as the current assessment approaches 
which are used to assess information security culture. The limitations of the current 
assessment approaches were discussed in order to answer the third sub-question, 
namely: What is lacking in the existing approaches which may be used to assess 
information security culture? 
It may be concluded from this chapter that, despite the fact that information 
security culture is a complex subject and, as such, may not have been 
comprehensively defined in a way which is acceptable to all, many researchers do 
agree that information security culture is important and that it needs to be fostered 
within an organisation to enable employees to perform their daily tasks in a secure 
manner, consistent with the prevailing information security policies. 
Fostering an information security culture is part of the information security culture 
management cycle or process. This process usually starts with the assessment of 
the existing information security culture (the current state). The current approaches 
for assessing information security culture chosen for this research study; although 
thorough in some aspects, do not constitute an integrated approach that 
comprehensively assesses all the levels of an information security culture.  The 
current approaches to the assessment of information security culture chosen for this 
research study all utilise some form of auditing, either as an assessment method or 
approach. However, not one has adopted a formal IS auditing approach which 
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utilises an established IS control framework so that the assessment process may be 
replicated in another organisation. 
The next chapter will explore IS control frameworks in order to evaluate the role 
which IS control frameworks may play in this research study in assessing information 
security culture within an organisation.  
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Chapter 4 : IS control frameworks 
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 discussed information security culture, including the way in which an 
information security culture may be created, fostered and assessed. It was 
established that the current approaches to assessing information security culture 
chosen for this research study do not present an integrated approach that 
comprehensively assesses all the levels of information security culture. It was also 
established that the current approaches to the assessment of information security 
culture utilise some form of auditing either as an assessment method or an 
approach, but that not one has adopted a formal IS auditing approach which utilises 
an established IS control framework so that the assessment process may be 
replicated in another organisation. This chapter will seek to fill this gap.  
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This chapter focuses on IS control frameworks in order to evaluate the role which 
IS control frameworks may play in this research study in assessing information 
security culture within an organisation. It should be noted that some sources refer to 
control frameworks as audit frameworks but, for the purpose of this research study, 
the term “control frameworks” will be used. 
This chapter will address the following research questions as stated in section 1.5: 
Sub-question 4: Which components could be utilised in the assessment of 
information security culture for each of the culture’s underlying levels? 
Sub-question 5: What process may be followed in assessing information security 
culture for all four levels? 
In order to answer sub-questions 4 and 5, this chapter, firstly, provides a brief 
description of IS auditing in section 4.2, followed by a discussion of IS control 
frameworks in section 4.3 in order to identify the components applicable to this 
research study. The PDCA cycle as a process that may be utilised for the 
assessment of information security culture is discussed in section 4.4 and, finally, 
section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Information systems auditing  
In view of the fact that this research study resides within the IS domain and that 
section 3.6.3 proposed a control framework as the preferred method with which to 
conduct an assessment of information security culture, this section provides a brief 
background to IS auditing. 
According to Gallegos, Senft, Manson, and Gonzales (2004), information 
systems auditing, which is synonymous with Information technology (IT) auditing, 
involves the evaluation of an organisation’s information systems, operations and 
practices aimed at assuring the integrity of an organisation’s information. The 
evaluation may include the assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
computer-based practices in economic terms as well as the assessment of internal 
controls within the IT environment in order to assure reliable, valid and secure 
information. 
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ISACA (2009a) expresses this in a different way by stating that IS auditing is a 
process that collects and evaluates evidence in order to ascertain whether 
information systems and the related resources adequately protect assets, maintain 
data integrity and availability, provide reliable and relevant information, and allow 
effective realization of organisational goals and efficient use of resources. ISACA 
(2009a) also refers to the need to have in place an internal control structure that 
provides reasonable assurance with regards to the realisation of business, 
operational and control objectives as well as the timely prevention, detection and 
correction of undesirable events.  
Thus, the objectives of an IS audit include the evaluation and assessment of 
processes to ensure that assets (information, applications, infrastructure and people) 
are protected and that the seven attributes of information (effectiveness, efficiency, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, compliance and reliability) are maintained (Kaul, 
n.d.). IS auditing also serves to discover where improvements are needed within an 
organisation to ensure compliance with both internal and external laws and 
regulations (Lovaas, 2009). 
According to Gallegos et al. (2004), the heavy reliance on computer technology 
by organisations in order to carry out their daily functions and which comes with high 
risks has necessitated the need for management to look to the audit function to 
provide the assurance that adequate controls are in place. 
The internal control system acts as a shield (internal control shield) protecting an 
organisation’s information assets and also acts as the first line of defence to reduce 
the rate of occurrence of undesirable events such as unauthorised access, fraud, 
human errors and security events (Hall & Singleton, 2005; ISACA, 2009a; Tipton & 
Krause, 2007). An organisation’s system of internal control is linked to information 
security culture as information security culture is linked to the business “objectives, 
operating and regulatory environment, potential threats, risk impacts, operational 
flexibility and resilience” which form part of an organisation’s system of internal 
controls (ISACA, 2009a, p. 13; 2011a, p. 117). 
Control frameworks such as the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations (COSO) 
and Control Objectives for Standardisation (COBIT) are used to evaluate the 
adequacy of internal controls. A control framework is aimed at providing a common 
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language that may be used to discuss and understand the link between objectives, 
risks, controls and performance (Deloitte Touche LLP, n.d.). The next section 
explores the generally accepted control frameworks that may be utilised in the 
assessment of information security culture. 
 
4.3 IS control frameworks 
Based on the proposal in section 3.6.3, namely, that a control framework be utilised 
for the assessment of information security culture within the technology/IS domain, 
this section explores various IS control frameworks to identify the components 
relevant to this research study. 
A control framework is a “structured way of categorising controls to ensure the 
whole spectrum of control is covered adequately” (Cougias, Halpern, Herold, & 
Koop, 2007, p. 42). A number of control frameworks have been established to assist 
organisations in assessing their system of internal controls, including COSO, COBIT, 
International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO), Control Self-Assessment (CSA), 
and IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL). Table 4.1 presents a number of control 
frameworks referenced from various sources in order to establish the most 
commonly used frameworks. The tick () in each column represents a reference 
from the source while a cross (X) represents no reference from source. 
 
Table 4.1 IS control frameworks and sources 
 SOURCE REFERENCED 
IS CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
COSO COBIT CSA ISO ITIL 
1 Dickins, O'Hara, and Reisch 
(2010) 
      X X 
2 Amudo and Inanga (2009)     X X X 
3 (Lovaas, 2009)     X   X 
4 (Singleton, 2007)   X X X X 
5 Moeller (2008) X   X     
6 (Klamm & Watson, 2009)   X X X X 
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 SOURCE REFERENCED 
IS CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
COSO COBIT CSA ISO ITIL 
7 (Deumes & Knechel, 2008)   X X X X 
8 (V. Cerullo & M. Cerullo, 
2005) 
  X X X X 
9 (Damianides, 2005)   X X X X 
10 (Brown & Nasuti, 2005)     X X   
11 Ridley, Young, and Carroll 
(2004) 
    X X   
12 IT Governance Institute 
(2007a) 
    X X X 
13 Cougias et al. (2007)     X     
14 (The institute of internal 
auditors, 2008) 
    X   X 
TOTAL 13 9 1 4 4 
 
It is evident in table 4.1 that most of the sources referenced COSO and COBIT as 
the commonly used IS control frameworks. COSO is the generally accepted control 
framework for enterprises while COBIT is the generally accepted control framework 
for IT (IT Governance Institute, 2007b). However, despite the fact that ISO 27002 is 
not among the most commonly used control frameworks, it is information security 
specific and, since the focus is on information security culture in this study, it was 
deemed relevant to include ISO 27002. ISO 27002 may be used to supplement the 
COBIT framework by covering the specific area of information security management 
(IT Governance Institute, 2007b). Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between 
COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002. 
It should be noted that COSO is the least specific of the identified frameworks 
and ISO 27002 is the most specific. Elements of many more specific frameworks, 
like ISO 27002, thus often derive from COSO or COBIT. This is reflected in the fact 
that IT Governance Institute (2011) lists ISO frameworks as the second most 
common framework used despite the fact that academic authors view COSO and 
COBIT as more common. 
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Figure 4.1 The relationship between COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 
 
COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 are further explored and utilised in this research 
study and will be discussed in the sub sections below (4.3.1 – 4.3.3). 
 
4.3.1 The COSO internal control ‒ integrated framework 
The COSO framework is widely accepted and used globally to design, implement 
and assess the effectiveness of an organisation’s internal controls (Dickins et al., 
2010; IT Governance Institute, 2007a).  
COSO defines internal control as “ a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of reporting, compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations” (Committee of sponsoring organisations of the 
Treadway commission (COSO), 1994, p. 3; Singleton, 2007). Figure 4.2 depicts the 
COSO framework. The COSO framework comprises the control objectives to be 
achieved (columns), the components required to achieve these objectives (rows) and 
the third dimension of the cube which represents the organisational structure 
(Committee of sponsoring organisations of the Treadway commission (COSO), 
1994; Singleton, 2007). 
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Figure 4.2 The COSO internal control framework (COSO, 1992) 
 
Management sets high level organisational objectives which are aligned to the 
organisation’s mission and values. Such objectives may be based on the operational 
needs of the organisation, standards, laws and regulations (Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 1994). The COSO 
framework defines 3 control objectives, namely, operations, financial reporting and 
compliance (Committee of sponsoring organisations of the Treadway commission 
(COSO), 1994; Dickins et al., 2010; Singleton, 2007). Table 4.2 summarises the 
three COSO objectives. 
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Table 4.2 The COSO control objectives 
Operations 
 
Operations objectives refer to the attainment of an entity’s mission. The objectives of 
the entity/organisation cascade into related operational sub objectives within the sub 
sections of the organisation. The operational objectives are geared towards 
improving the organisation’s effectiveness and efficiency and such objectives may 
include quality improvement, production time and cost reduction, innovation 
improvement, customer improvement and employee satisfaction (Committee of 
sponsoring organisations of the Treadway commission (COSO), 1994). 
Financial 
reporting 
 
Financial reporting objectives relate to the reliability of financial statements. The 
reporting objectives may be financial or non–financial or internal or external 
reporting. Internal reporting objectives are determined by internal requirements while 
external reporting objectives are determined mainly by standards and/or regulations 
(Committee of sponsoring organisations of the Treadway commission (COSO), 
1994). 
Compliance 
 
Compliance objectives relate to adherence to applicable laws and regulations. The 
organisation should have an understanding of which laws and regulations apply to 
the organisation in question (Committee of sponsoring organisations of the 
Treadway commission (COSO), 1994). 
 
In order to achieve the above control objectives, COSO defines five components 
or elements, namely control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring (Cascarino, 2007; COSO, 2011; 
Davis, Schiller, & Wheeler, 2007; Dickins et al., 2010; Singleton, 2007). Table 4.3 
summarises the five COSO components. 
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Table 4.3 The COSO control components 
CONTROL COMPONENT 
 
DESCRIPTION 
Control environment 
 
This component sets the tone and influences the control consciousness of organisational members. It is the foundation for the other 
control components, providing process, structure and discipline. It also reflects top management’s attitudes, awareness and actions 
regarding the importance of internal controls as well as the emphasis placed on the organisation’s policies, procedures and methods 
and the organisational structure. Factors/elements of control environment include commitment to integrity and ethical values, 
oversight responsibility, structure, authority and responsibility, commitment to competence and accountability (Davis et al., 2007; 
Ernst & Young, 2003; Hall, 2011).  
Risk assessment 
 
Every entity is exposed to various risks, both internally and externally, and it is essential that these risks be assessed. Risk 
assessment involves the analysis (risk identification and estimation) and evaluation of risks in order to achieve specific objectives. 
Risk assessment determines the value of information assets, identifies the threats and vulnerabilities to organisational assets, 
identifies existing controls and their effect on the risks identified, determines potential consequences and then prioritises and ranks 
the risks (ISO/IEC 27005, 2008). This, in turn, forms the foundation for determining how the risks should be managed (share or 
transfer, avoid, accept or reduce the risks). In view of changes in regulatory, industrial, economic and operating conditions, 
mechanisms to identify and address the related risks are required (Cascarino, 2007; Hall, 2011; Singleton, 2007)  
Control activities 
 
Control activities refer to the policies and procedures that assist in ensuring that management’s directives which are geared towards 
the mitigation of risks are implemented (Hall & Singleton, 2005; Singleton, 2007) ). With the heavy reliance of organisations on 
information systems, controls over such systems are essential. COSO groups IS control activities broadly into general and application 
controls (Hall, 2011). General controls are not application specific and include controls over areas such as IT infrastructure, IT 
governance, access and security to databases and operating systems while application controls ensure the integrity of specific 
systems (Hall, 2011). 
Information and 
communication 
 
Information is necessary for an organisation to accomplish its internal control responsibilities in support of the realisation of the 
organisation’s objectives. Such information should be communicated in a form and time frame that enables employees to understand 
their internal control responsibilities as well as the importance of achieving objectives (Davis et al., 2007)  
Monitoring 
 
The monitoring of controls is aimed at checking that the controls are working efficiently and effectively. This may be done through 
periodic assessments. In terms of the monitoring function it is important that changes to the operating environment, either internal or 
external, are reflected in changes in the risk assessment and control activities (Dickins et al., 2010). 
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In order to ascertain the suitability of the COSO framework for use in this 
research study, table 4.4 maps the COSO components to the assessment of 
information security culture. This research study focuses on the COSO components 
that are directly applicable to information security culture only. These components 
are classified as being directly applicable to information security culture if the 
components are directly relevant in the assessment of information security culture or 
not directly applicable to information security culture if the components are not 
directly relevant in the assessment of information security culture. For example, risk 
assessment is relevant in terms of information security but it is not directly relevant to 
information security culture and, thus, risk assessment will be categorised as not 
directly applicable to information security culture. 
 
Table 4.4 The COSO components in relation to this research study 
COSO 
COMPONENT 
RELATION TO THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Control 
environment 
In view of the description of control environment presented in table 4.3, the control 
environment is directly applicable to this research study with regards to “tone at the 
top”. In terms of assessing information security culture, management support is 
necessary as fostering information security culture requires top management 
support ‒ see section 3.5. 
Risk 
assessment 
In view of the description of risk assessment presented in table 4.3, this component 
is not directly applicable to this research study. However, a risk assessment should 
be conducted in order to identify organisational assets, threats to these assets and 
security controls to assist in the formulation of an information security policy which 
will help the organisation to integrate the requisite information security culture. .  
Control 
activities 
In view of the description of control activities presented in table 4.3, the control 
activity is directly applicable to this research study in terms of the policies and 
procedures which are needed to foster information security culture ‒ see section 
3.5. 
Information 
and 
communication 
In terms of information security culture and in view of the description of information 
and communication presented in table 4.3, the information and communication 
component is directly applicable to this study. For example, in order to ensure 
awareness and compliance with regards to the information security policy, it is 
essential that the policy be communicated in a form understandable to the 
employees and in a timely way. 
Monitoring In view of the description of monitoring presented in table 4.3 this component is 
directly applicable to this research study. In terms of information security culture, the 
periodic assessment of the information security culture is necessary following 
changes within the organisational environment ‒ see section 3.5.3. Periodic 
assessment may act as a monitoring mechanism to help enforce and improve 
information security culture.  
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4.3.2 The COBIT framework 
Information technology has become extremely important to the success of 
organisations and, thus, it needs to be used and controlled effectively and efficiently 
(Gallegos et al., 2004). If information technology is to succeed in delivering with 
regards to an organisation’s business requirements, it is essential that a system of 
internal control be put in place. The COBIT framework contributes to this by linking 
IT to business requirements, organising IT activities into a process model, defining 
the management control objective to be considered and identifying the major IT 
resources to be leveraged (IT Governance Institute, 2007b). 
COBIT is a comprehensive framework of control objectives. It assists IS auditors, 
managers and executives in discharging their fiduciary responsibilities, 
understanding their IT systems and deciding the level of security and control that is 
sufficient (Gallegos et al., 2004). It should be noted, however, that despite the fact 
that COBIT 5 exists, this research will focus on the COBIT 4.1 framework as this 
study had been commenced before the release of COBIT 5.  
The COBIT framework is the generally accepted internal control framework for IT 
(IT Governance Institute, 2007b). COBIT supports the governance of IT by providing 
a framework that ensures that IT is aligned to the business, IT enables the business 
and maximises benefits, IT resources are used in a responsible way and IT risks are 
managed appropriately (IT Governance Institute, 2007a). IT governance involves 
strategic alignment, value delivery, resource management, risk management and 
performance measurement (ISACA, 2009a; IT Governance Institute, 2007a)  
The COBIT 4.1 framework comprises a set of IT processes which are grouped 
into the following four domains, namely plan and organise (PO), acquire and 
implement (AI), deliver and support (DS), and monitor and evaluate (ME) with each 
process having one or more control objectives (Cascarino, 2007; Davis et al., 2007; 
IT Governance Institute, 2007b). The IT processes are supported by the control 
activities which are required for the effective implementation of the said IT processes 
(Dickins et al., 2010). 
For the purposes of this research study and in the interest of simplicity, figure 
4.3 illustrates COBIT as the COBIT cube. 
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Figure 4.3 The COBIT cube from IT Governance Institute (2007a) 
 
Table 4.5 summarises the four COBIT domains and their related processes 
(Gallegos et al., 2004; IT Governance Institute, 2007a). 
 
Table 4.5 The COBIT domains and their related processes 
DOMAINS DESCRIPTION 
Plan and organise (PO) Addresses the strategies and tactics and how to identify the best 
way in which IT may contribute to realising the business 
objectives. The processes under this domain include: 
PO1: Define a strategic IT plan 
PO2: Define the information architecture. 
PO3: Determine technological direction. 
PO4: Define the IT processes, organisation and relationships. 
PO5: Manage the IT investment. 
PO6: Communicate management aims and direction. 
PO7: Manage IT human resources. 
PO8: Manage quality. 
PO9: Assess and manage IT risks. 
PO1:0 Manage projects. 
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DOMAINS DESCRIPTION 
Acquire and implement (AI) Realisation of the IT strategy requires the identification, 
development and acquisition of IT solutions as well as the 
implementation and integration of these solutions with the 
business process. The processes under this domain include: 
AI1: Identify automated solutions. 
AI2: Acquire and maintain application software. 
AI3: Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure 
AI4: Enable operation and use. 
AI5: Procure IT resources. 
AI6: Manage changes. 
AI7: Install and accredit solutions and changes. 
Deliver and support (DS) Addresses the delivery of the required services ranging from 
traditional operations in respect of security and continuity to 
training. Included in this domain is the processing of data by 
application systems which falls under application controls. The 
processes under this domain include: 
DS1: Define and manage service levels. 
DS2: Manage third-party services. 
DS3: Manage performance and capacity. 
DS4: Ensure continuous service. 
DS5: Ensure system security. 
DS6: Identify and allocate costs. 
DS7: Educate and train users. 
DS8: Manage service desk and incidents. 
DS9: Manage the configuration. 
DS10: Manage problems. 
DS11: Manage data. 
DS12: Manage the physical environment. 
DS13: Manage operations. 
Monitor and evaluate (ME) Addresses the regular assessment of IT processes over time 
with regards to quality and compliance with control 
requirements. Also addresses performance management, 
monitoring of internal control, regulatory compliance and 
governance. The processes under this domain include: 
ME1: Monitor and evaluate IT performance. 
ME2: Monitor and evaluate internal control. 
ME3: Ensure regulatory compliance. 
ME4: Provide IT governance. 
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The COBIT framework applies the COSO concepts to the provision of domains, 
processes and control activities for the IT environment which guides organisations in 
the meeting of their internal control requirement (Davis et al., 2007). In order to 
ascertain the suitability of the COBIT framework for use in this research study, table 
4.6 maps the applicable COBIT domains and processes to the assessment of 
information security culture. It should be noted that certain COBIT processes are not 
directly applicable to information security culture while others are directly applicable 
to information security culture. This research study focuses on those COBIT 
processes that are directly applicable to information security culture only - see 
section 4.3.1 for explanation of directly and not directly applicable components. 
 
Table 4.6 The COBIT domains in relation to this research study 
THE COBIT DOMAINS AND 
PROCESSES 
RELATION TO THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Plan and organise In terms of information security culture and considering the 
description of this domain and its processes in table 4.5, the following 
are directly applicable to this research study, namely, defining a 
strategic information security plan, determining technological 
direction for information security, defining IT processes, organisation 
and relationships in terms of information security, managing 
information security investment, communicating management aims 
and direction in terms of information security, managing IT human 
resources with regards to information security, and managing quality. 
The process of assessing and managing information security risk is 
not directly applicable to this research study. 
Acquire and implement In terms of information security culture and considering the 
description of this domain and its processes in table 4.5, not one of 
the components of this domain are not directly applicable to this 
research study. 
Deliver and support In terms of information security culture and considering the 
description of this domain and its processes in table 4.5, the following 
are directly applicable to this research study, namely, ensuring 
continuous service in terms of information security, ensuring systems 
security, identifying and allocating information security costs, 
educating and training users in terms of information security, and 
managing service desk and information security incidents. 
Monitor and evaluate In terms of information security culture and considering the 
description of this domain and its processes in table 4.5, the following 
are directly applicable to this research study, namely, ensuring 
information security regulatory compliance and providing information 
security governance. 
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It is clear from both tables 4.4 and 4.6 that both the COSO framework and the 
COBIT framework may be applied in this research study as reference tools for the 
assessment of information security culture. 
However, the COSO framework was deemed to be too broad with minimal 
implementation guidelines and, thus, it may be difficult to execute (Dickins et al., 
2010). The COBIT framework is discussed from the viewpoint of IT processes and 
identifying processes in terms of the assessment of information security culture may 
be difficult (Akoka & Comyn-Wattiau, 2010). It may, thus, be more beneficial to use 
the COBIT framework as an overall approach to the management and governance of 
IT coupled with more detailed standards such as ISO 27002 for information security 
management. ISO 27002 is discussed in the next section (IT Governance Institute, 
2007a). 
 
4.3.3 ISO/IEC 27002:2005  
The ISO/IEC 27002:2005 standard (security techniques ‒ code of practice for 
information security management) may be classified as the current best practice in 
the subject area of information security management systems (ISMS). Its goal is to 
provide information to those tasked with the implementation of information security 
within an organisation (IT Governance Institute, 2008). 
The standard defines information security as “the protection of information from a 
wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimise business risks, 
and maximise return on investments and business opportunities”(ISO/IEC 27002, 
2005b, p. viii).  Information security is realised through the implementation of an 
appropriate set of controls, including software and hardware functions, organisational 
structures, policies and procedures. The establishment, implementation, monitoring, 
review and improvement of these controls are essential to ensure that the 
organisation’s specific security and business objectives are met (ISO/IEC 27002, 
2005b). While ISO/IEC 27002 provides suitable controls within the ambit of an 
information security management system (ISMS), ISO/IEC 27001 defines the 
information security requirements in respect of the implementation of the information 
security controls (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). However, both standards may be used 
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together. The ISO/IEC 27001 requirements correspond to the control clause in 
ISO/IEC 27002. 
It is important to identify an organisation’s security requirements and this may be 
done through risk assessment and/or through compliance with legal/regulatory 
requirements. After the security requirements and risks have been identified and 
decisions taken to mitigate risks, appropriate controls must be implemented in order 
to reduce these risks (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005b). The standard includes 11 security 
control clauses (components of an ISMS) with each clause containing 1 or more 
security control categories. Each control category contains a control objective and 
the control necessary to achieve the objective. Table 4.7 lists the control clauses 
together with the associated categories and objectives. 
 
Table 4.7 Mapping of information security control clauses and categories (ISO/IEC 27002, 
2005a) 
 CONTROL CLAUSE CONTROL CATEGORY  
ISO 5: Security policy ISO 5.1: Information security policy 
ISO 6: Organisation of information 
security 
ISO 6.1: Internal organisation 
ISO 6.2: External parties 
ISO 7: Asset management ISO 7.1: Responsibility for assets 
ISO 7.2: Information classification 
ISO 8: Human resources security ISO 8.1: Prior to employment 
ISO 8.2: During employment 
ISO 8.3: Termination or change of employment 
ISO 9: Physical and environmental 
security 
ISO 9.1: Secure areas 
ISO 9.2: Equipment security 
ISO 10: Communications and 
operations management 
ISO 10.1: Operational procedures and responsibilities 
ISO 10.2: Third party service delivery management 
ISO 10.3: Systems planning and acceptance 
ISO 10.4: Protection against malicious and mobile code 
ISO 10.5: Backup 
ISO 10.6: Network security management 
ISO 10.7: Media handling 
ISO 10.8: Exchange of information 
ISO 10.9: Electronic commerce services 
ISO 10.10: Monitoring 
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 CONTROL CLAUSE CONTROL CATEGORY  
ISO 11: Access control ISO 11.1: Business requirements for access control 
ISO 11.2:  User access management 
ISO 11.3: User responsibilities 
ISO 11.4: Network access control 
ISO 11.5: Operating system access control 
ISO 11.6: Application and information access control  
ISO 11.7: Mobile computing and teleworking 
ISO 12: Information systems 
acquisition, development and 
maintenance 
ISO 12.1: Security requirements pertaining to information 
systems 
ISO 12.2 :Correct processing in applications 
ISO 12.3: Cryptographic controls 
ISO 12.4: Security of system files 
ISO 12.5: Security in development and support processes 
ISO 12.6 :Technical vulnerability management 
ISO 13: Information security incident 
management 
ISO 13.1: Reporting information security events and 
weaknesses 
ISO 13.2: Management of information security incidents 
and improvements  
ISO 14: Business continuity 
management 
ISO 14.1: Information security aspects of business 
continuity management 
ISO 15: Compliance ISO15.1: Compliance with legal requirements 
ISO 15.2: Compliance with security policies and 
standards, and technical compliance 
ISO 15.3: Information systems audit considerations 
  
Table 4.8 summarises the ISO 27002 framework in relation to this research study. It 
should be noted that some of the ISO 27002 control categories are indirectly 
applicable to information security culture while some of the control categories are 
directly applicable to information security culture. This research study focuses on the 
ISO 27002 control categories that are directly applicable to information security 
culture only - see section 4.3.1 for explanation of directly and not directly applicable 
components. 
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Table 4.8 The ISO 27002 in relation to this research study 
ISO 27002 
CONTROL CLAUSE 
RELATION TO THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Security policy In terms of information security culture, information security policy is directly 
applicable to this research study. The information security policy should be 
developed and approved by management and published and communicated 
to all employees. The policy should be reviewed periodically.  
Organisation of 
information security 
In terms of information security culture, internal organisation is directly 
applicable to this research study in terms of management commitment to 
ensure an adequate information security culture through visible organisational 
structures for information security. This includes management support in 
terms of direction and demonstrated commitment as well as the assignment 
and acknowledgement of information security roles and responsibilities. 
Asset management This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Human resource 
(HR) security 
This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Physical security 
and environmental 
security 
This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Communications 
and Operations 
management 
In terms of information security culture, operational procedures and 
responsibilities as well as monitoring are directly applicable to this research 
study. 
Access control This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Information systems 
acquisition, 
development and 
maintenance 
This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Information security 
incident 
management 
In terms of information security culture the reporting of information security 
incidents and managing information security incidents are directly applicable 
to this research study. 
Business continuity 
management 
This category is not directly relevant in the assessment of information security 
culture. Hence, in terms of information security culture, this category is not 
directly applicable to this research study. 
Compliance In terms of information security culture, the following are directly applicable to 
this research study: compliance with legal requirements and information 
security policies and standards. 
 
Page | 76  
 
It is clear from table 4.8 that aspects of ISO 27002 may be used in the 
assessment of information security culture in terms of selecting appropriate controls 
with which to address an organisation’s security requirements. 
Having established the relevance of IS control frameworks and their components 
which are relevant to the assessment of information security culture, it is necessary 
to establish a process for the assessment of information security culture. 
The assessment of information security culture may be executed in accordance 
with the “Plan – Do – Check – Act” cycle which is described in the next section. 
 
4.4 The "Plan-Do-Check-Act" (PDCA) cycle 
The “Plan – Do – Check – Act” (PDCA) cycle is utilised by various organisations to 
implement quality management and continuous improvement of information security 
management systems (ISO 19011, 2002; ISO 9001, 2008; ISO/IEC 27000, 2009; 
ISO/IEC 27001, 2005; Mataracioglu & Ozkan, 2011; Sokovic, Pavletic, & Pipan, 
2010). The PDCA cycle may be associated with the COBIT domains (Bakry & 
Alfantookh, 2006; Suresh, 2009). 
The PDCA cycle which is utilised by most management systems was identified as 
a suitable process that may be used for the assessment of information security 
culture. The PDCA cycle also supports the research objective of developing an 
integrated IS auditing and process approach for the assessment of an information 
security culture. Accordingly, the PDCA, as utilised in this research study, is 
interpreted from an IS auditing perspective. Figure 4.4 illustrates the PDCA cycle 
and is discussed below.  
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Figure 4.4 The PDCA cycle  
 
Plan – The first step is to plan the assessment (plan stage) and identify the 
information security culture assessment requirements, including establishing the 
objective and scope of the assessment, establishing any specific requirements, 
assumptions or considerations.  
Do – After the scope has been identified, the next step (do stage) is to obtain a 
general understanding of the security environment and to identify the relevant 
information security components based on the identified scope. 
Check – The next step (check stage) evaluates the overall information security 
culture for the identified components (from do stage).  
Act – In the next step (act stage), the assessment is concluded with a report to 
management. The report typically includes an executive summary, the purpose of 
the assessment and date, summary of the scope, summary of results, findings, 
recommendations and a conclusion.  
Continuous monitoring - It is important to ensure that the desired information security 
culture is maintained through continuous monitoring and review. 
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The PDCA cycle as described in section 4.4 describes how the process of 
assessing information security culture fits into the overall IS audit process. The 
PDCA will contribute towards the development of a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on IS control frameworks with the aim of determining their 
suitability for use in the research study. This chapter aimed to answer sub-question 
4, namely: Which components could be utilised in the assessment of information 
security culture for each of the culture’s underlying levels and sub-question 5: What 
process may be followed in assessing information security culture for all four levels? 
In order to answer sub-questions 4 and 5, the chapter provided some background 
on information systems auditing. The chapter also discussed the commonly 
recommended control frameworks of COSO and COBIT, ISO 27002 which is specific 
to information security and also the PDCA cycle which may be utilised in the 
assessment of information security culture. 
It was established that IS auditing involves the assessment of an organisation’s 
information systems, operations and practices so as to ensure the integrity of the 
organisation’s information. In view of the heavy reliance on the part of organisations 
on computer technology which is associated with numerous risks, the audit function 
is important to assure management that adequate controls are in place to mitigate 
the risks. An organisation’s internal control system is linked to information security 
culture and frameworks, such as COSO and COBIT which are internal control 
frameworks which may be used for the purposes of reference in order to assess 
information security culture as well as to ISO 27002 which is specific to information 
security. The COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 frameworks were mapped to the 
assessment of information security culture in tables 4.4, 4.6 and 4.8 respectively in 
order to ascertain their suitability with regards to their use as references. From the 
tables it was established that certain COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components are 
directly applicable to this research study and may, thus, be used as reference for the 
assessment of information security culture. These components will be utilised in the 
development of the control framework in chapter 5. 
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In assessing information security culture it is necessary that there be a process to 
follow with regards to conducting the assessment and, to that effect, the PDCA cycle 
was identified as suitable. Accordingly, the PDCA cycle will be utilised in the 
development of a control framework for the assessment of information security 
culture in chapter 5. 
It may be concluded from this chapter that the COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 
frameworks, in conjunction with the PDCA cycle, may be used to develop a control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture across all of its levels ‒ 
see chapter 5.  
The next chapter will focus on the development of a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture. 
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Chapter 5 : A control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture 
 
Chapter 3:
Information security 
culture
Chapter 4:
 IS control 
frameworks
Chapter 5: 
A control framework for the 
assessment of information 
security culture
Chapter 7:
Conclusion
Chapter 1:
Introduction
Chapter 6:
Validation of control 
framework
Chapter 2:
Research philosophy, 
process and methods
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in section 3.6, it is necessary to assess information security culture 
across all its underlying levels if such a culture is to be fostered. In assessing 
information security culture across all its underlying levels certain factors that may 
influence information security culture at the different levels should be considered 
important in terms of the assessment.  
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Chapter 3 discussed the information security culture components relevant to this 
study. Chapter 4 described IS control frameworks namely COSO, COBIT & ISO 
27002 in order to ascertain their suitability as reference for the assessment of 
information security culture. Certain components were identified from the literature 
review in chapters 3 and 4 as directly applicable to the assessment of information 
security culture. A process (PDCA) for the assessment of information security culture 
was identified in chapter 4. The components within each framework which were 
identified will be incorporated as reference into the development of a control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture. 
This chapter focuses on the development of a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture. The control framework incorporates the 
following: the information security culture components which have been identified, 
the components within each of the frameworks (COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002) which 
have been identified as being directly applicable to the assessment of information 
security culture and a process for assessing information security culture. 
This chapter will address the main research question as stated in section 1.5, 
namely: How can an integrated IS auditing and process approach contribute to 
the development of a control framework for the assessment of the current 
state of information security culture across all its underlying levels? 
In order to address the main research question, this chapter discusses the 
structure of the control framework for the assessment of information security culture 
in section 5.2. This is followed by a discussion of the components of the control 
framework in section 5.3 while section 5.4 discusses the integration of the 
components which have been identified. Section 5.5 describes a process for the 
assessment of information security culture while the control framework is developed 
in section 5.6 and the use of the proposed control framework discussed in section 
5.7. Section 5.8 concludes this chapter. 
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5.2 Structure of the control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture 
According to Cougias et al. (2007), a framework may be referred to as “an 
arrangement of parts that provides a form or structure to the whole”. A framework 
may also be defined as a “broad overview, outline, or skeleton of interlinked items 
which supports a particular approach to a specific objective, and serves as a guide 
that can be modified as required by adding or deleting items (BusinessDictionary, n 
d)”.  
Based on these definitions the proposed control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture comprises the following aspects: 
 A structure comprising a number of components – the components of the 
proposed framework are made up of the information security culture 
components (section 5.3.1) as well as the COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 
components (section 5.3.2).  
 The integration of components – the integration of the information security 
culture components and the COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components 
(section 5.4). 
 A process in terms of which to perform the assessment – process for the 
assessment of information security culture (section 5.5). 
The next section discusses the components of the proposed control framework. 
 
5.3 Components of the proposed control framework 
The components of the proposed control framework include the information security 
culture components and the applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components. 
The information security culture components are discussed in the next section. 
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5.3.1 Information security culture components 
The components influencing information security culture as used in this research 
study refer to those components that contribute towards the creation and/or fostering 
of information security culture within an organisation. 
From section 3.5, the following components that may influence information 
security culture are identified and listed below. Some of the components listed in 
table 3.1 were considered not to be directly relevant to information security culture 
and thus not included in the list of information security culture components - see 
section 4.3.1 for explanation of directly and not directly applicable components. The 
list of information security culture components was created based on argumentation 
and interpretation of the methods and terms described in section 3.5. It should be 
noted that an organisation’s needs in terms of information security culture are 
specific to the organisation since organisations have different information security 
requirements. Thus, the components listed below are by no means exhaustive and 
are in no particular order. 
The components have been labelled for easy identification and will be named 
information security culture component 1 [ISCC1] to information security culture 
component 8 [ISCC8]. 
Information security culture components: 
 Top management support for information security [ISCC1] 
 Regulatory and legal requirement for information security [ISCC2] 
 Organisational structures and responsibilities for information security [ISCC3] 
 Information security budget [ISCC4] 
 Information security awareness, training and education [ISCC5] 
 Information security incident management [ISCC6] 
 Information security compliance [ISCC7] 
 Continuous improvement through change management and monitoring or 
management review [ISCC8] 
Each of these information security culture components influences information 
security culture at one or more levels. Table 5.1 illustrates, in summary, the mapping 
of the information security culture components which have been identified to the 
information security culture levels. As an example to explain the use of table 5.1, top 
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management support (information security culture component 1) influences 
information security culture at the four levels as follows: 
1. Artefacts level (second column) – The measurable artefacts comprise the 
organisational structures and responsibilities for information security in the 
organisation as well as documented information security policy. 
2. Espoused values level (third column) – Management approval of information 
security policies and procedures as well as statement of top management 
commitment to information security. 
3. Shared tacit assumptions level (fourth column) – Employees’ belief in top 
management commitment to information security.  
4. Information security knowledge level (fifth column) – An awareness of top 
management buy-in is essential for effective information security.
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Table 5.1 Mapping of information security culture components to information security culture levels 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
CULTURE COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES 
SHARED TACIT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
KNOWLEDGE 
Top management support for 
information security 
[ISCC1] 
Organisational structure and 
responsibilities for information 
security within the 
organisation, documented 
information security policy 
Management approval of information 
security policies and procedures, 
statement of top management 
commitment to information security 
Employees’ belief in 
management commitment to 
information security 
Awareness that top 
management buy-in is essential 
for effective information security 
Information security 
regulatory and legal 
requirements 
[ISCC2] 
Documented statement of 
compliance to relevant 
information security regulatory 
and legal standards 
Top management commitment to 
information security governance 
Employees belief in complying 
with applicable information 
security laws and regulations 
All employees understand roles 
and responsibilities to 
information security laws & 
regulations 
Organisational structures 
and responsibilities for 
information security 
[ISCC3] 
Organisational organogram 
reflecting information security 
functions 
Top management commitment to 
relevant information security 
structures 
Top management belief in the 
necessity for information 
security structures and roles 
Employees are knowledgeable 
of information security roles & 
responsibilities 
Information security budget 
[ISCC4] 
Information security budget Top management commitment to 
adequate funding for information 
security 
Top management belief that 
spending on information 
security is not a waste of 
money 
Decision makers are 
knowledgeable about 
appropriate information security 
spend 
Information security 
awareness, training and 
education 
[ISCC5] 
Awareness, training and 
educational 
programmes/materials 
Top management commitment to 
relevant information security 
education for all employees 
Employees’ belief that 
information security training 
and education is important 
Employees are equipped with 
relevant information security 
knowledge & skills 
Information security incident 
management 
[ISCC6] 
Incident management system Commitment to information security 
incident management function 
Employees’ belief in 
information security incident 
reporting and management 
Employees are knowledgeable 
about information security 
incident management system 
Information security 
compliance 
[ISCC7] 
Employees’ key performance 
indicators (KPIs) include 
information security functions 
Enforcement of information security 
compliance 
All employees believe that 
information security 
compliance is important 
Employees have the necessary 
skills and knowledge to enable 
information security compliance 
Continuous improvement 
through change 
management and monitoring 
or management review 
[ISCC8] 
Regular review of information 
security functions 
Commitment to regular reviews Top management believe that 
continuous monitoring and 
improvement of information 
security functions are 
important 
Relevant parties are 
knowledgeable of change 
management and regular review 
processes for information 
security 
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Having identified the information security culture components, the next step is 
to identify the applicable COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components. This is discussed 
in the next section. 
 
5.3.2 COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components 
This section summarises the applicable components from COSO, COBIT & ISO 
27002, based on the discussion of these IS control frameworks in section 4.3. 
As established in table 4.4 in section 4.3.1, risk assessment is not directly 
applicable to information security culture. Accordingly, in view of the fact that this 
research study focuses only on those components that are directly applicable to 
information security culture, risk assessment is excluded from the applicable COSO 
components. 
Based on table 4.4 in section 4.3.1, the following COSO components are deemed 
to be applicable to information security culture: 
 COSO – control environment 
 COSO – control activities 
 COSO – information and communication 
 COSO – monitoring 
Based on table 4.6 in section 4.3.2, the following COBIT components are 
deemed to be applicable to information security culture: 
 
Table 5.2 Applicable COBIT components 
COBIT DOMAIN 
 
APPLICABLE COBIT COMPONENTS 
Plan and organise (PO) PO1: Defining a strategic information security plan 
PO3: Determining technological direction for information security 
PO4: Defining information security processes, organisation and 
relationships in terms of information security 
PO5: Managing information security investment 
PO6: Communicating management aims and direction in respect of 
information security 
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COBIT DOMAIN 
 
APPLICABLE COBIT COMPONENTS 
PO7: Managing IT human resources with regards to information 
security 
PO8: Managing quality 
Deliver and support (DS) DS5: Ensuring system security 
DS6: Identifying and allocating information security costs 
DS7: Educating and training users with regards to information 
security 
DS8: Managing service desk and information security incidents 
Monitor and evaluate (ME) ME3: Ensuring information security regulatory compliance 
ME4: Providing information security governance 
 
Based on table 4.8 in section 4.3.3, the following ISO 27002 components are 
deemed to be applicable to information security culture: 
 
Table 5.3 Applicable ISO 27002 components 
CONTROL CLAUSE APPLICABLE ISO 27002 COMPONENTS 
Security policy ISO 5.1: Information security policy 
Organisation of information security ISO 6.1: Internal organisation 
Communications and operations 
management 
ISO 10.1: Operational procedures and responsibilities 
ISO 10.10: Monitoring 
Information security incident 
management 
ISO 13.1: Reporting information security incidents 
ISO 13.2: Managing information security incidents 
Compliance ISO 15.1: Compliance with information security legal 
requirements 
ISO 15.2: Compliance with information security policies and 
standards 
 
Each of these components (COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002) may influence 
information security culture at one or more levels, namely, artefacts (AF), espoused 
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values (EV), shared tacit assumptions (STA) and information security knowledge 
(ISK) and will, thus, be incorporated into the control framework ‒ see section 4.6. 
In assessing information security culture and utilising the information security 
culture components, the applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components may 
be used as reference for the assessment of information security culture at the 
different levels. 
Having discussed the information security culture components and the applicable 
COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components as well as how they map to the different 
levels of information security culture, the next section describes the integration of the 
different components of the proposed control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture. 
 
5.4 Integration of the components identified 
In this section the applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components are 
mapped to the information security culture components at the different levels ‒ see 
table 5.4. The applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO components are colour coded for 
easy identification with COSO being coloured red, COBIT blue and ISO green. 
Top management support for information security as an information security 
culture component [ISCC1] is used to explain table 5.4. 
Top management support for information security (first column) is mapped to the 
different information security culture levels (artefacts in the second column, 
espoused values in the third column, shared tacit assumptions in the fourth column 
and information security knowledge in the fifth column). Within each information 
security culture level, a reference is made to COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002. This 
reference indicates which component(s) of COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 may be 
used as reference for the assessment of the information security culture component, 
in this case, top management support for information security. 
In order to assess top management support for information security, the following 
COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components may be used as reference. The COSO, 
COBIT and ISO components in bold indicate that the specific COSO, COBIT and 
ISO component (s) may apply to more than one level. 
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At the artefacts level - The COSO control environment and control activities, 
COBIT PO4, PO6, and ME4, ISO 5.1, ISO 6.1, and ISO 10.1. 
At the espoused values level – The COSO control environment and control 
activities, COBIT PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, and ME4, ISO 5.1, 6.1, and 10.1 
At the shared tacit assumptions level - The COSO control environment and control 
activities, COBIT PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, and ME4, ISO 5.1, 6.1, and 10.1. 
At the information security knowledge level – The COSO information and 
communication, COBIT PO4, PO6, and PO7, ISO 5.1, 6.1, and 10.1. 
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Table 5.4 Integration of information security culture components, information security culture levels and COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 
components 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY CULTURE 
COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES 
SHARED TACIT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
KNOWLEDGE 
Top management support 
for information security 
[ISCC1] 
Organisational structure and 
responsibilities for information 
security within the organisation, 
documented information security 
policy 
 
COSO: control environment, control 
activities  
COBIT: PO4, PO6,  ME4 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1  
Management approval of 
information security policies 
and procedures, statement of 
top management commitment 
to information security 
 
COSO: control environment, 
control activities 
COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4,  
PO6, ME4  
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Employees’ belief of 
management commitment 
to information security 
 
COSO: control 
environment, control 
activities 
COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, 
PO6, ME4 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Awareness that top management buy-in 
is essential for effective information 
security 
 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT:PO4, PO6, PO7 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Information security 
regulatory and legal 
requirements 
[ISCC2] 
Documented statement of 
compliance with relevant 
information security regulatory and 
legal standards 
 
COSO: control environment 
 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 
Top management commitment 
to information security 
governance 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 
Employees believe in 
complying to applicable 
information security laws & 
regulations 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 
All employees understand their roles 
and responsibilities to information 
security laws & regulations 
 
COSO: Information and communication 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 
Organisational structures 
and responsibilities for 
information security 
[ISCC3] 
Organisational organogram 
reflecting information security 
functions 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Top management commitment 
to relevant information security 
structures 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Top management believe in 
necessity of information 
security structures & roles 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Employees are equipped with 
knowledge regarding their information 
security roles and responsibilities 
COSO: Information and communication 
COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Information security 
budget 
[ISCC4] 
Information security budget 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct reference 
Top management commitment 
to adequate funding for 
information security 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct 
Top management believes 
that spending on 
information security is not a 
waste of money 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 
Decision makers are knowledgeable 
about appropriate information security 
spending 
 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct reference 
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INFORMATION 
SECURITY CULTURE 
COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES 
SHARED TACIT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
KNOWLEDGE 
reference ISO 27002: no direct 
reference 
Information security 
awareness, training and 
education 
[ISCC5] 
Awareness, training and 
educational programmes/materials 
 
COSO: information and 
communication 
COBIT: PO7, DS7 
ISO 27002: 8.2 
Top management commitment 
to relevant information security 
education for all employees 
 
 COSO: information and 
communication 
COBIT: PO7, DS7 
ISO 27002: 8.2 
Employees believe that 
information security training 
and education is important 
 
COSO: information and 
communication 
COBIT: PO7, DS7 
ISO 27002: 8.2 
Employees possess the relevant 
information security knowledge and 
skills 
 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT: PO7, DS7 
ISO 27002: 8.2 
Information security 
incident management 
[ISCC6] 
Incident management system 
 
COSO:  control environment 
COBIT: DS8 
ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Commitment to information 
security incident management 
function 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: DS8 
ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Employees believe in the 
value of information security 
incident reporting and 
management 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: DS8 
ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Employees are knowledgeable about 
information security incident 
management system 
 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT: DS8 
ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Information security 
compliance 
[ISCC7] 
Employees’ key performance 
indicators (KPIs) include 
information security functions 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
 
Enforcement of information 
security compliance 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
All employees believe that 
information security 
compliance is important 
 
COSO: control environment 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
Employees are equipped with thee 
necessary skills and knowledge to 
enable information security compliance 
 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
Continuous improvement 
through change 
management and 
monitoring or 
management review 
[ISCC8] 
Regular review of information 
security functions 
 
COSO: monitoring 
COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 
Commitment to regular 
reviews 
 
COSO: monitoring 
COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002:10.10 
Top management believe 
that continuous monitoring 
and the improvement of 
information security 
functions are important 
COSO: monitoring 
COBIT:PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 
Relevant parties are knowledgeable 
about change management and regular 
review processes for information 
security 
COSO: information and communication 
COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 
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Having described the integration of the information security culture components 
and the applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components, the next section 
describes a process for the assessment of information security culture. 
 
5.5 A process for the assessment of information security culture 
The assessment of information security culture should be performed across all its 
underlying levels as established in section 3.6. Based on the literature review from 
sections 3.6 and 4.4, and through argumentation and interpretation, the “concepts” 
from sections 3.6 and 4.4 were integrated to develop a process for the assessment 
of information security culture. The process for the assessment of information 
security culture involves four steps as described in the following sub sections. 
 
5.5.1 Define objectives, scope and requirements 
This step forms part of the (plan) stage, as described in section 4.4. It is essential to 
understand the organisation which is to be assessed in terms of its information 
security culture. This includes identifying the information security culture assessment 
requirements as well as the objective and scope of the assessment. 
 
5.5.2 Understand the information security environment and identify ISC component 
This step forms part of the (do) stage, as described in section 4.4. This stage 
involves obtaining a general understanding of the security environment and 
identifying the relevant assessment components (as listed in table 5.4) based on the 
scope identified. 
 
5.5.3 Evaluate each component based on the applicable ISC level 
This step forms part of the (check) stage, as described in section 4.4 and involves 
evaluating the overall information security culture for the components identified in the 
do stage. The evaluation should be conducted for each level of the information 
security culture to be assessed and involves four stages: 
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 Stage 1: Assess the artefacts level 
 The applicable artefacts, as identified in table 5.1, should be 
assessed utilising applicable COSO/COBIT/ISO 27002 components, 
as identified in table 5.4. Applicable method(s) of assessment should 
be used, as indicated in sections 3.6.2. As illustrated in table 3.4, 
Schlienger and Teufel (2003a) proposed a combination of document 
analysis, interviews and observation. 
 Stage 2: Assess the espoused values level 
The applicable espoused values, as identified in table 5.1, should be 
assessed utilising applicable COSO/COBIT/ISO 27002 components, 
as identified in table 5.4. Applicable method(s) of assessment should 
be used, as indicated in section 3.6.2. As described in section 3.4, 
Schlienger and Teufel (2003a) proposed a combination of document 
analysis, interviews and questionnaires. 
 Stage 3: Assess shared tacit assumptions level 
The applicable shared tacit assumptions, as identified in table 5.1, 
should be assessed utilising applicable COSO/COBIT/ISO 27002 
components, as identified in tables 5.4.  Applicable method(s) of 
assessment should be used, as indicated in section 3.6.2. The 
assessment of shared tacit assumptions may be conducted as 
described in section 3.6.2 using questionnaires and interviews as 
proposed by Da Veiga and J. Eloff (2010) and Schlienger and Teufel 
(2003a).  
Stage 4: Assess the information security knowledge level 
The applicable information security culture knowledge, as identified 
in table 5.1, should be assessed utilising applicable 
COSO/COBIT/ISO 27002 components, as identified in tables 5.4. 
The applicable method(s) of assessment should be used as 
indicated in section 3.6.2.  
Each of the four underlying levels of information security culture may contribute to 
the overall effect of the information security culture within an organisation. Such a 
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contribution may either be positive or negative, as conceptualised by Van Niekerk 
and R. Von Solms (2010) and illustrated in figure 5.1. 
 
BL = Minimum acceptable baseline 
SL = Nett security level 
AF= Artefacts 
EV = Espoused values 
STA= Shared tacit assumptions 
ISK= Information security knowledge
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Figure 5.1 Basic elements of the conceptual framework (Van Niekerk & R. Von Solms, 2010) 
 
 BL – This is the minimum acceptable baseline which indicates an acceptable 
minimum security baseline. This would refer to an information security culture 
with a net effect that meets the minimum requirement of a particular industry 
standard. 
 SL – This is the net security level which indicates the net effect of information 
security culture on the overall security effort. The SL represents the 
cumulative effect of the four underlying levels of information security culture 
which may be less secure (to the left), more secure (to the right) or just as 
secure (overlapping) as the minimum acceptable baseline (BL). 
 AF (Artefacts) – The artefacts node denotes the relative “strength” of the 
artefacts (AF) level of information security culture. Whether the AF level is 
towards the left, towards the right or exactly on the baseline is indicative of 
how “strong” the AF level is in terms of information security. Towards the left 
of the BL indicates less secure than the acceptable minimum, towards the 
right indicates more secure than the acceptable minimum and exactly on BL 
indicates just as secure as the acceptable minimum. 
 EV (Espoused values) – The espoused values node denotes the relative 
“strength” of the espoused values level of an organisation. The various 
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policies and procedures encompassed in this level may be less, more or just 
as comprehensive as that which is recommended as the minimum acceptable 
baseline. 
 STA (Shared tacit assumptions) – The shared tacit assumptions node 
denotes the relative “strength” of the STA level of an organisation. Employees’ 
underlying beliefs and values may be less, more or just in favour of the good 
security practices as required by the minimum acceptable baseline. 
 ISK (Information security knowledge) – This node denotes the amount of 
knowledge which employees possess with regards to information security in 
terms of carrying out their job functions in a secure manner. Employees may 
possess less knowledge, more knowledge or the exact minimum required 
level of information security knowledge. 
The vertical alignment of all four nodes (AF, EV, STA, ISK) to the minimum 
acceptable baseline and to each other denotes the relative “strength” and “stability” 
of the information security culture. In figure 5.1 all four nodes are aligned to each 
other and towards the right of SL, thus denoting a secure and stable information 
security culture. The terms “strong” and “stable”, as used above, denote a desirable 
and predictable information security culture. 
Organisations desire an information security culture that is both “strong” and 
“stable” and with all four of the underlying levels of information security culture 
aligned with the net security level and with each other. The strength and stability of 
an organisation’s information security culture will depend on the way in which the 
four levels interact with each other. This interaction may be influenced by the 
information security culture components as listed in section 5.3.1 and depending on 
the degree of existence or absence of one or more of the components. In essence, it 
may be said that these components are necessary for a desirable information 
security culture as either their existence or their absence at any level may influence 
the desired information security culture. Thus, these components may be regarded 
as an organisation’s information security culture requirements. 
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5.5.4 Writing a report and concluding the assessment 
This step forms part of the (act) stage, as described in section 4.4, and entails writing 
a report, stating the findings and indicating any possible recommendations. The 
report should state the findings and the recommendations for each level of 
information security culture assessed. This step is important in order to ensure on 
going improvement of information security culture. 
 
5.5.5 Continuous monitoring 
As established in section 3.5.3, an organisation’s environment changes frequently as 
a result of both internal and external forces. Such forces may, in turn, necessitate the 
reassessment of the information security culture. This step is important to ensure on 
going improvement of information security culture.  
The next section combines the components (section 5.3), their integration 
(section 5.4) and the process (section 5.5) in order to present the proposed control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture. 
 
5.6 Proposed control framework for the assessment of information 
security culture 
A control framework is developed and presented in this section. The control 
framework incorporates the following:  
1. A basic structure based on the information security culture and on the COSO, 
COBIT and ISO 27002 components, as identified in sections 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively.  
2. A process for the assessment of information security culture (PDCA). 
The control framework is a high level framework with the aim of providing guidance 
(direction) to perform an assessment of information security culture for all its 
underlying levels. The proposed framework was developed with the intention to 
customise, align or integrate with existing assessment tools or methods for the 
evaluation of information security culture. 
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Figure 5.2 depicts the proposed control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture. 
 
Plan Do
CheckAct
Define objectives, scope and 
requirements
Understand the information 
security environment, and 
identify relevant ISC
components
Report and 
conclude 
assessment
Evaluate each                 
component based 
on applicable ISC
levels
 
Figure 5.2 A control framework for the assessment of information security culture 
 
The control framework for the assessment of information security culture provides 
general guidance to plan for, identify, evaluate and report on the information security 
culture of an organisation for all its underlying levels. The control framework is based 
on the PDCA cycle and consists of five parts which represent the five stages in the 
assessment of information security culture namely, PLAN (blue quadrant), DO 
(green quadrant), CHECK (purple quadrant), ACT (red quadrant) and a continuous 
monitoring (cyclic arrow). The various components of the control framework are 
described in the following sub sections. 
 
5.6.1 Plan 
The first step is to plan the assessment (plan stage) and identify the information 
security culture assessment requirements, including 
a. Establish the objective and scope of the assessment. 
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b. Establish any specific requirements, assumptions or considerations 
(i.e. Will the assessment evaluate all the information security culture 
components? Will the assessment focus on all levels of information 
security culture? Will COSO, COBIT, or ISO or a combination be used 
as reference?  If the company has undergone a previous assessment, 
the recommendations from the previous assessment should be 
considered for incorporation into the present scope). 
 
5.6.2 Do 
After the scope has been identified, the next step (do stage) is to obtain a general 
understanding of the security environment and to identify the relevant assessment 
components based on the identified scope utilising the information security culture 
components as a guideline from table 5.4. For example: Company ABC utilised 
COBIT as a control framework and based on the understanding of their information 
security environment, the information security culture components included is 
[ISCC1, 3-8]. The scope for Company ABC in this example is shown in table 5.5 (the 
greyed cells & text are excluded from the scope). 
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Table 5.5 Snapshot showing the scope for the assessment of the information security culture for company ABC 
INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE 
COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES SHARED TACIT ASSUMPTIONS INFORMATION SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
Top management support for information 
security 
[ISCC1] 
Organisational structure and responsibilities for 
information security within the organisation, documented 
information security policy 
Management approval of information security policies 
and procedures, statement of top management 
commitment to information security 
Employees‘ belief in management commitment 
to information security 
Awareness that top management buy-in is essential for 
effective information security 
COSO: control environment, control activities COSO: control environment, control activities COSO: control environment, control activities 
 
COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO4, PO6,  ME4 COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4,  PO6, ME4  COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, ME4 COBIT:PO4, PO6, PO7 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Information security regulatory & legal 
requirements 
[ISCC2] 
Documented statement of compliance to relevant 
information security regulatory & legal standards 
Top management commitment to information security 
governance 
Employees believe in complying to applicable 
information security laws & regulations 
All employees understand roles & responsibilities to 
information security laws & regulations 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 
Organisational structures and 
responsibilities for information security 
[ISCC3] 
Organisational organogram reflecting information security 
functions 
Top management commitment to relevant information 
security structures 
Top management believe in necessity for 
information security structures and roles 
Employees are knowledgeable about information 
security roles and responsibilities 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Information security budget 
[ISCC4] 
Information security budget Top management commitment to adequate funding for 
information security 
Top management believes that spending on 
information security is not a waste of money 
Decision makers are knowledgeable about appropriate 
information security spending 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference 
Information security awareness, training 
and education 
[ISCC5] 
Awareness, training and educational 
programmes/materials 
Top management commitment to relevant information 
security education for all employees  
 
Employees believe that information security 
training and education is important 
Employees possess relevant information security 
knowledge and skills 
 COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 
 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 
Information security incident 
management 
[ISCC6] 
Incident management system Commitment to information security incident 
management function 
Employees believe in information security 
incident reporting and management 
Employees are knowledgeable about information 
security incident management system 
 COSO:  control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 
 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Information security compliance 
[ISCC7] 
Employees’’ key performance indicators (KPIs) include 
information security functions 
Enforcement of information security compliance All employees believe information security 
compliance is important 
Employees possess  the necessary skills and 
knowledge to enable information security compliance 
 COSO: Control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
Continuous improvement through change 
management and monitoring or 
management review 
[ISCC8] 
Regular review of information security functions Commitment to regular reviews Top management believe continuous 
monitoring and improvement of information 
security functions are important 
Relevant parties are knowledgeable about change 
management and regular review processes for 
information security 
COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO8 COBIT: PO8 COBIT:PO8 COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002:10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 
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5.6.3 Check 
The next step (check stage) evaluates the overall information security culture, for the 
identified components (from do stage). 
 
5.6.4 Act 
In the next stage (act stage), the assessment is concluded with a report to 
management. The report typically includes an executive summary, the purpose of 
the assessment and date, summary of the scope, summary of results, findings, 
recommendations and a conclusion.  
 
5.6.5 Continuous monitoring 
As stated in section 2.5.1, information security culture needs to be continuously 
maintained. This means that the assessment of information security culture should 
be repeatedly done to ensure that the culture remains at a desired state. In doing so, 
report from previous assessment should be considered when planning a 
reassessment. 
Having presented the control framework, the next section describes how the 
framework could be used. 
 
5.7 Applicability of the proposed control framework 
The assessment of information security culture should be done for all identified 
information security culture components at all levels. An imaginary company (ABC) 
will be used for the illustration. 
In order to carry out the assessment, the first step (plan) is to identify the 
information security culture assessment requirements for company ABC. This is 
formally achieved through an introductory meeting with relevant management of 
company ABC. Firstly, the assessment objectives and scope are established (i.e. 1) 
provide an information security culture assessment of all 4 underlying levels, 2) 
identify any gaps or deficiencies, 3) based on output of assessment, establish a 
basis for continuous monitoring and improvement of information security culture). 
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Secondly, establish specific assessment requirements (i.e. Company ABC is utilising 
COBIT as a control framework, assessment will therefore only focus on reference to 
COBIT controls and recommendations from previous assessment of information 
security culture for company ABC should be considered for incorporation into the 
present scope). 
After the scope has been identified, the next step (DO stage) is firstly to obtain a 
general understanding of the security environment of company ABC. This can be 
achieved through reviews of relevant documentation of company ABC and interviews 
with relevant management of company ABC. Secondly, to identify the relevant 
assessment components based on the identified scope (i.e. Company ABC utilised 
COBIT as a control framework as established in the plan stage and based on the 
understanding of their information security environment, company ABC decides to 
include [ISCC1, 3-8] for the assessment as shown in table 5.5.  
The next step (check stage) is to evaluate the overall information security culture 
based on the scope (from plan stage) and the identified components (from do stage). 
The evaluation could be carried out using methods like surveys and interviews as 
suggested by other researchers like (Da Veiga & J. Eloff, 2010; Schlienger & Teufel, 
2003a). The results of the evaluation can be interpreted using the conceptual model 
presented by Van Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010). For example, taking the 
assessment of top management support for information security culture [ISCC1] 
across all levels of information security culture as shown in figure 5.4, the result 
shows that the espoused values are desirable but top management lacks the 
necessary information security knowledge (red arrow) and do not have the desired 
beliefs and values (red arrow) with the result that the artefact level is insecure (red 
arrow). A red arrow signifies a finding thus in this example the findings for company 
ABC in terms of assessment of top management support for information security are 
that top management lacks the necessary information security knowledge as well as 
beliefs and values resulting in  unsecured behaviour. In order to address the lack of 
information security knowledge, beliefs and values of top management, company 
ABC needs to implement certain controls. Based on the mapping with COBIT in table 
5.5, the recommended controls that should be implemented include: COBIT: PO1, 
PO3, PO4, PO6, PO7, and ME4. 
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Different scenarios could arise following the assessment of top management 
support for information security culture across all levels of information security 
culture. For example, if the result of the assessment of top management support for 
information security culture across all four levels is aligned, then the information 
security culture with regards to top management support for information security is 
desirable and would correspond to the scenario illustrated in figure 5.1. On the other 
hand, if the result of the assessment of all four levels is misaligned the following 
scenarios in figures 5.3 – 5.6 could result as conceptualised and adapted from Van 
Niekerk and R. Von Solms (2010). 
 
BL = Minimum acceptable baseline 
SL = Nett security level 
AF= Artefacts 
EV = Espoused values 
STA= Shared tacit assumptions 
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Figure 5.3 Insecure and “mostly stable” information security culture 
 
In figure 5.3 the finding is that the top management of company ABC lacks the 
necessary requisite information security knowledge represented by the red arrow 
leading to the artefacts falling short of the acceptable minimum baseline represented 
by the red arrow. To address the findings, company ABC needs to implement certain 
controls (recommendations) and based on the mapping with COBIT in table 5.5, the 
recommended controls that need to be implemented include: COBIT: PO4, PO6, 
PO7, and ME4. By implementing the COBIT controls (recommendations), findings 
are addressed and if operating effectively, could lead to the alignment of all four 
levels and the attainment of a desirable information security culture in terms of top 
management support for information security represented by the green line. 
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Figure 5.4 Insecure and unstable information security culture 
 
In figure 5.4 the finding is that the espoused values are desirable but top 
management lack the necessary information security knowledge (red arrow) and  the 
desired beliefs and values (red arrow) with the result that the behaviour which is 
evident in the artefacts are insecure (red arrow). In this scenario, both the 
information security knowledge and the beliefs and values of top management need 
to be addressed. To address the findings, company ABC needs to implement certain 
controls (recommendations) and based on the mapping with COBIT in table 5.5, the 
recommended controls that need to be implemented include: COBIT: PO1, PO3, 
PO4, PO6, PO7, and ME4. By implementing the COBIT controls (recommendations), 
findings are addressed and if operating effectively, could lead to the alignment of all 
four levels and the attainment of a desirable information security culture in terms of 
top management support for information security represented by the green line. 
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Figure 5.5 Secure and unstable information security culture 
 
In figure 5.5 the espoused values are desirable, top management have adequate 
information security knowledge but the level of information security knowledge 
negates the fact that the employees do not have the desired beliefs and values 
resulting in an overall information security culture that is more secure than the 
minimum acceptable baseline. However, it may be possible for the employees to 
behave in an insecure manner regarding a specific control if such a control conflicts 
with their beliefs and values (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003b). For the information 
security culture to be desirable (green line) in terms of top management support for 
information security, company ABC should implement the COBIT controls 
(recommendations) that address top management’s lack of shared tacit 
assumptions. Thus based on the mapping in table 5.5, the controls to implement 
include COBIT PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, and ME4. By implementing the COBIT 
controls (recommendations), findings are addressed and if operating effectively, 
could lead to the alignment of all four levels and the attainment of a desirable 
information security culture in terms of top management support for information 
security represented by the green line. 
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Figure 5.6 Secure and unstable information security culture 
 
In figure 5.6, both the information security knowledge and beliefs and values of 
top management are desirable leading to a behaviour that is secure despite the lack 
of espoused values (finding). To address the finding, company ABC needs to 
implement certain controls (recommendations) and based on the mapping with 
COBIT in table 5.5, the recommended controls that need to be implemented include: 
COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, and ME4. By implementing the COBIT controls 
(recommendations), findings are addressed and if operating effectively, could lead to 
the alignment of all four levels and the attainment of a desirable information security 
culture in terms of top management support for information security represented by 
the green line. 
From the above scenarios (figures 5.3 – 5.6) it is evident that the net effect of 
information security culture can be positively or negatively influenced by how 
“secure” the underlying levels of information security culture are and the information 
security culture components as identified in section 5.3.1 can contribute towards this 
influence. 
Following the evaluation, the next step (Act) is to present a report to the 
management of company ABC. The report should include an executive summary, 
the purpose of the assessment and date, summary of the scope, and summary of 
results. The report should indicate the findings represented by the red arrows in the 
different scenarios and the recommendations (the COBIT controls to be 
implemented) needed to achieve a desirable information security culture in terms of 
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top management support for information security which is represented by the green 
line in the different scenarios. 
Following changes in the security needs of Company ABC, it is important for 
company ABC to engage in continuous monitoring through reassessments to ensure 
that the desired information security culture is maintained. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the development of a control framework for the assessment 
of information security culture following the proposal discussed in chapter 3. The 
chapter addressed the main research question of this research study namely: How 
can an integrated IS auditing and process approach contribute to the development of 
a control framework for the assessment of the current state of information security 
culture across all its underlying levels? 
The control framework was developed from a number of components, namely, 
information security culture components and applicable COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 
components, as well as the integration of the components and a process for the 
assessment. 
The information security culture components were identified and listed in section 
5.3.1 while the applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components were identified 
and presented in section 5.3.2. The integration of both sets of components was 
conducted and presented in section 5.4. This integration was necessary in order to 
illustrate the use of the COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 as reference for the assessment 
of the information security culture components. As described in section 5.5, a 
process for the assessment was described utilising the PDCA cycle. 
The proposed control framework was presented and the various components of 
the framework were described. The framework presented a method for the 
assessment of information security culture which was further explored in terms of 
applicability by using company ABC. 
It may be concluded from this chapter that COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 may be 
used as reference for the assessment of information security culture in an 
organisation utilising the PDCA cycle. However, it is important to ensure the validity 
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of the control framework. The next chapter will focus on the validation of the control 
framework. 
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Chapter 6 : Validation of the control framework  
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presented a control framework for the assessment of information security 
culture and the applicability/usability of the control framework was conceptually 
illustrated. 
This chapter focuses on the validation of the control framework. It is important to 
validate both the quality and the usability of such a control framework to ensure its 
value. The chapter discusses the methods that could be used for the validation of the 
control framework in section 6.2. This is followed by the validation of the control 
framework in section 6.3 while section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 Methods for validating the control framework 
As stated in section 2.4.3 this research study utilised design science as its research 
strategy. Part of the design science process as presented in table 2.3 is to validate 
the artefact (framework) to ensure rigor of the research study. Such validation may 
be achieved qualitatively by means of a focus group or an elite/expert interview as 
identified from literature review.  Both are discussed in the next sub-sections in order 
to support the reason behind the choice of method adopted for validation by this 
research study. Firstly, a focus group is discussed followed by expert\elite interviews. 
 
6.2.1 Focus group 
A focus group is a way in which qualitative data may be collected by engaging a 
small number of people in an interactive manner and focusing on a particular issue 
or topic (Carson, Gilmore, Perry, & Gronhaug, 2001; Wilkinson, 2004). As suggested 
by Carson et al., (2001); Krueger and Casey, (2000); C. Marshall and Rossman, 
(2011); Morgan, (1988); The Pennsylvania state university, (2007); Threlfall, (1999); 
Wilkinson, (2004), a focus group, sometimes known as a focus group interview has 
some advantages and disadvantages. These are outlined below. 
Advantages of a focus group: 
 It is an economical, fast and efficient method for obtaining data from multiple 
participants. 
 It involves a social environment in which participants are encouraged to share 
their opinions without there being pressure to reach a consensus. 
 The interactive nature of a focus group may yield important data. 
 In a focus group, questions may be identified which had not occurred to the 
researcher. 
 It is flexible, thus enabling participants to explore issues as they arise. 
 
Disadvantages of a focus group: 
 The results may be unbalanced as a result of group dynamics. 
 The information obtained may be either suppressed or biased as a result of 
an absence of confidentiality and anonymity. 
Page | 110  
 
 It requires the facilitator to be well skilled. 
 It is not undertaken in a natural setting as the participants are aware they are 
being observed. 
 It may be difficult to assemble the participants. 
Having discussed focus groups, the next sub section will discuss expert/elite 
interviews. 
 
6.2.2 Expert/elite interviews 
According to C. Marshall and Rossman (2011), an expert/elite interview is a 
specialised type of interview that focuses on a particular interviewee, “the elite”. Elite 
individuals are individuals who are regarded as prominent, influential and/or well 
informed in an organisation or community. They are selected as participants based 
on either their expertise in areas relevant to the research in question or their 
viewpoint within an organisation or specialised fields. Elite individuals may also be 
selected as a result of their distinct perspectives (Gillham, 2000). According to 
Hochschild, (2009); C. Marshall and Rossman, (2011); Tansey, (2007), there are 
both advantages and disadvantages to expert/elite interviews. These are outlined 
below. 
Advantages of expert/elite interview: 
 The interviewer may triangulate among the interviewees without revealing the 
names of previous subjects. 
 Elites are able to provide a general view of an organisation or its affiliates. 
 The interviewees are able to provide valuable information as a result of the 
positions they hold in an organisation, e.g. they may report on an 
organisation’s policies, past histories and future plans from a specific 
viewpoint. 
 
Disadvantages of expert/elite interview: 
 It may be difficult to gain access to the elites in view of their demanding time 
constraints. 
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 The interviewer may need to adapt the questions in such a manner as to 
enable the elite the freedom to use his/her knowledge and imagination. 
From the above discussion on focus groups and elite interviews it is evident that 
both methods may be used to validate the control framework. However, based on 
the following, this research study adopted an elite interview method: 
1. Information security culture is a specialised field and it would, thus, have been 
difficult to bring the experts together in a focus group.  
2. The experts could respond at their own time without too many time 
constraints, as is often the problem with a focus group. 
3.  The researcher is able to obtain information that is unbiased as the experts 
are neither being observed nor do they know one another. 
The next section will discuss the way in which expert/elite interviews were utilised 
in this research study. 
 
6.3 Validation of control framework through an expert/elite interview 
As stated in section 6.2.2, the validation of the developed control framework was 
done via an expert interview. The interview was conducted in the form of a formal 
review by the selected experts via email as stated in section 2.5. 
In order for the expert review to be conducted, this research study needed to 
accomplish the following: 1) construct an expert review instrument and 2) select 
experts for the review. The construction of the expert review instrument is discussed 
in the next sub section followed by a discussion of how the experts were selected. 
 
6.3.1 Construction of the expert review instrument 
The constructed review instrument was a 12-paged word document. The review 
instrument needed to be concise and yet comprehensive enough for the expert 
reviewer to understand and be able to validate the control framework. The expert 
review instrument consisted of 5 sections.  
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Section 1 (introduction and aim of study) provided some background to the 
research study, the problem this research study intends to address and how this 
research study proposes to address the problem.  
Section 2 (proposed control framework) presented the developed control 
framework for the assessment of information security culture and consists of 3 key 
aspects: 1) a structure comprising of a number of components (ISCC, COSO, COBIT 
& ISO 27002 components), 2) the integration of the identified applicable 
components, and 3) a process to perform the assessment. 
Section 3 (overview of the proposed control framework) presented an overview of 
the developed control framework which is based on the PDCA cycle comprising of 
five stages: plan, do, check, and act.  
Section 4 (requirements for expert review) presented 5 questions for the expert 
reviewers to answer relating to the developed control framework. The questions 
were constructed in a way that enabled the expert reviewer to judge the validity of 
the developed control framework. 
Section 5 (Appendices) provided a list of the information security culture 
components and directly applicable COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components. See 
appendix B for details of the expert review instrument. 
Having discussed the construction of the expert review instrument, the next sub 
section discusses how the experts were selected. 
 
6.3.2 Selection of expert reviewer 
The selection of the expert reviewers was based on the expertise of the reviewers 
within the field of study. Two primary authors in the field of study as identified from 
section 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2 namely A. Da Veiga and S.Teufel were contacted for 
input as expert reviewers. Prof Teufel provided some verbal input at the ISSA 
conference where the researcher presented a paper Okere et al., (2012) while Dr Da 
Veiga provided a written input. See appendix C for details of the written input of Dr 
Da Veiga.  Prof Teufel verbally alluded to the gap (the four levels of information 
security culture were not addressed by her research) identified by the researcher 
and published as Okere et al., (2012). 
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Further input from other experts in the field of information security was sought 
and Dr M. Gerber responded and provided a written input - see appendix D for 
details of the written input of Dr Gerber.  
More input was sought but due to time constraint, the researcher was unable to 
get more input. However, due to the quality of the reviewers that responded, the 
researcher believes that the control framework has been reasonably validated. 
Having discussed the selection of expert reviewers, the next sub section 
discusses the feedback from the expert reviewers. 
 
6.3.3 Feedback from the expert reviewers 
This section provides the feedback from the expert reviewers. Both expert reviewers 
(Da Veiga and Gerber) raised some concerns in their feedback. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 
present the concerns raised by expert reviewers 1 and 2 respectively and how the 
researcher incorporated the feedback into the research by addressing the concerns 
raised by the expert reviewers. 
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 Table 6.1 Concerns raised by expert reviewer 1 
CONCERNS OF A. DA VEIGA CONCERNS ADDRESSED 
How were the 8 ISCC identified? The list of ISCC was selected based on argumentation and interpretation of the methods and terms described in 
section 3.5. The researcher also alludes to the fact that the list of the ISCC is not exhaustive. This is because an 
organisation’s needs in terms of information security culture are specific to the organisation since each organisation 
has different information security requirements. 
How did the researcher define “control” in control 
framework 
The researcher provided a definition for “control framework” in section 4.3. 
What methods are used for  assessing the 
different levels of information security culture 
Specific method for assessing information security culture is outside the scope of this research study. The 
developed control framework is a high level framework and was developed with the intention to customise, align or 
integrate with existing assessment tools or methods as stated in section 5.6.  
“other researchers do not utilise a formal auditing 
guideline or framework when assessing such a 
culture” is incorrect 
Current assessment approaches as discussed in sections 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2 utilise some form of auditing but the 
researchers do not explicitly espouse the use of such an auditing framework as established in section 3.6.3. 
What version of COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 
was used? 
The researcher indicated the version as stated in section 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 respectively. 
Use of “employees are known not to adhere” 
needs to be reworded 
Sentence has been reworded as stated in section 3.2. 
“Audit “approach as used is incorrect. Current assessment approaches as discussed in sections 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2 indicate the use of some form of 
auditing but the researchers do not explicitly state that the “auditing” does not involve the assessment of controls 
and the gathering of evidence. 
Assessment of information security knowledge 
has been addressed 
As gathered from Dr S. Teufel at the 2012 ISSA conference, information security knowledge was not addressed. 
Reference for objecting to the use of 
questionnaire to assess culture is incorrect and to 
include positive contributions of the use of a 
survey 
Positive contribution of the use of a survey in assessing information security culture was acknowledged in section 
3.6.2.2, however this research study focuses on the limitations of current approaches hence the discussion on 
limitations. References objecting to the use of questionnaire are given in section 3.6.3. 
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Table 6.2 Concerns raised by expert reviewer 2 
CONCERNS OF M. GERBER CONCERNS ADDRESSED 
Specific reference to the PDCA cycle is required due to different 
interpretations of the PDCA 
The researcher specified in section 4.4 that the PDCA as utilised in this research study is 
interpreted from an auditing perspective 
It will be beneficial to illustrate the assessment methods utilised 
by the control framework 
Specific assessment methods are outside the scope of this research study. The 
developed control framework is a high level framework and was developed with the 
intention to customise, align or integrate with existing assessment tools or methods as 
stated in section 5.6. 
Clarity on the different scenarios used to illustrate the 
applicability of the developed framework i.e. 1) how is the green 
line interpreted and what will the result from the assessment be, 
2) will the assessment be an estimation or an exact 
measurement of level of information security culture, 3) what 
form will the gap be represented in the framework (output of 
framework and how it will be represented), and 4)  how will an 
organisation utilise the result of the assessment to improve its 
information security culture. 
The applicability of the control framework is illustrated in the different scenarios as 
described in section 5.7. No empirical work was employed in this research study, thus the 
researcher does not indicate whether the assessment will be an estimate or an exact 
measurement of information security culture. The gap identified from the assessment 
which is indicated by the red arrows in the different scenarios in section 5.7 represent the 
findings and will be included in the report that is given to management.  An organisation 
will implement the recommendations to address the findings as described in section 5.7. 
The organisation should also engage in continuous monitoring through reassessment to 
ensure continuous improvement. 
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From tables 6.1 and 6.2, it can be concluded that the researcher had adequately addressed 
the concerns raised by the expert reviewers in validating the developed control framework. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter described the validation of the developed control framework in order to 
ensure the quality of the control framework. The chapter discussed two qualitative 
methods that could be used for the validation of the control framework namely focus 
group and elite\expert interview. The choice of expert\elite interviews by this 
research study for the validation of the control framework was substantiated. It was 
noted that the expert\elite interview took the form of a formal review by email.  
The chapter further discussed the validation of the control framework 
incorporating how the expert review instrument was constructed and how the 
reviewers were selected. The main aim of the expert review was to ascertain 
whether this research study has contributed in addressing the gaps identified in 
current approaches for assessing information security culture as identified in 
sections 1.4 and 3.6.3 and published at the ISSA conference as Okere et al., (2012)  
Both written inputs from the expert reviewers agree that this research study 
contributes in addressing the identified gaps in current approaches for assessing 
information security culture.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the developed control framework is deemed valid. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Today’s organisations rely heavily on information for their day-to-day operations and, 
thus, with such reliance on information, it is vital that information be protected. 
To a large extent humans, by their behaviour, are at the centre of protecting an 
organisation’s information as they interact with information and information 
resources. However, humans are considered as the weakest link in the security 
chain and, therefore, they constitute a challenge in the management of information 
security. 
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In order to address this human factor researchers have suggested the fostering 
of an information security culture. By fostering an information security culture 
information security becomes an integral part of the way in which employees function 
and, thus, they behave in a secure manner.  
The first step in fostering an information security culture involves the assessment 
of the culture. It is important for an organisation to assess its information security 
culture in order to be aware of the current state of the culture and then to work 
towards achieving a desired culture.  
Current approaches were assessed and found gaps and this study addresses 
gaps through the developed control framework. 
This chapter concludes this research study by providing a summary of the results 
of this research study, incorporating how the research questions were answered and 
the extent to which the research objectives were achieved (section 7.2). The 
contributions of the study are summarised in section 7.3 and suggestions for future 
research offered in section 7.4. 
 
7.2 Summary of results 
This section describes the extent to which the research objectives were achieved 
and the research questions answered. 
Primary research objective:  
As stated in section 1.6 the primary research objective for this research study was to 
develop a control framework for the assessment of information security 
culture across all its underlying levels. In order to realise this primary research 
objective, it became necessary to realise the following secondary research 
objectives, as identified in section 1.6. 
Secondary research objective 1: To describe information security culture in the 
field of information security. Chapter 3 described information security culture in the 
field of information security. There is no single definition/description for information 
security culture with various researchers describing information security culture in 
different ways. Several researchers have attributed the lack of a single definition to 
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the complexity of information security culture and this, in turn, has led some 
researchers to opt for a description of information security culture rather than a 
definition. This research study adopted a description for information security culture 
by adapting Schein’s model of organisational culture ‒ see section 3.3. Schein 
describes organisational culture as existing on three levels, namely, artefacts, 
espoused values and shared tacit assumptions. Schein’s model was adapted to 
render it specific to information security and to include a fourth level, namely, 
information security knowledge. This adapted model was illustrated in figure 3.2 and 
described in sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.4.  
This research study described information security culture as existing on four 
levels, namely, artefacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions and information 
security knowledge (section 3.4).  This, in turn, meant that the first secondary 
research objective had been realised and also provided an answer to the first sub 
question as stated in section 1.5, namely “How is information security culture defined 
in the field of information security? 
Secondary research objective 2: To determine ways to foster information security 
culture in an organisation. Section 3.5.2 described methods for fostering information 
security culture, including top management support, information security compliance, 
information security risk analysis, information security awareness and training, 
information security management standardisation and best practices, information 
security policy, organisational culture, and ethical conduct ‒ see summary in table 
3.1.  These methods form part of the information security culture components [ISCC] 
which were utilised in the development of a control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture (chapter 5). Section 3.5.3 described the process for 
fostering information security culture and included an eight-step process, including 
top management support and commitment, defining a specific business problem, 
developing a strategic action plan, creating a cultural fit, developing and choosing a 
change leader team, creating small wins, identifying metrics, measures and 
milestones, and reviewing and refining. This was illustrated in figure 3.3 and 
summarised in table 3.2. 
This research study described ways in which to foster information security culture 
(section 3.5.2 & 3.5.3). This, in turn, meant that the second secondary research 
objective had been realised and also provided an answer to the second sub question 
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as stated in section 1.5, namely “How may information security culture be fostered 
within an organisation? 
Secondary research objective 3: To demonstrate the gap in current approaches 
used to assess information security culture.  Chapter 3 described current 
approaches to assessing information security culture. Two assessment approaches 
were selected for the purposes of this research study. Section 3.6.3 described the 
limitations/gaps in the current assessment approaches which had been selected for 
this research study – see table 3.4. The following gaps were identified: 1) that the 
current approaches did not comprehensively assess all four levels of information 
security culture and 2) the assessment approaches utilised auditing but no formal 
auditing guidelines or framework were used. The identification of these two gaps 
realised the third secondary research objective and answered the third sub question, 
as stated in section 1.6, namely “What is lacking in the existing approaches which 
may be used to assess information security culture? 
Secondary research objective 4: To determine the components that could be used 
for the assessment of information security culture for each of the culture’s underlying 
levels. Chapter 4 explored existing IS control frameworks following the proposal in 
chapter 3 to utilise a formal IS control framework for the assessment of information 
security culture. In section 4.3 the commonly used existing IS control frameworks 
were identified, namely, COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 – see table 4.1. It should be 
noted that, despite the fact that ISO 27002 was not identified as one of the 
commonly used IS control frameworks, it was deemed relevant to include ISO 27002 
since it is information security specific and since the focus of this research study is 
on information security culture. Certain components of COSO (table 4.4), COBIT 
(table 4.6) and ISO 27002 (table 4.8) were identified that could be utilised as 
reference for the assessment of information security culture with regards to each of 
its underlying levels. These components, in turn, contributed to the development of a 
control framework for the assessment of information security culture – see chapter 5.  
Section 5.3.1 discussed information security culture components. The information 
security culture components refer to those components that influence information 
security by contributing towards the creation and/or fostering of information security 
culture in an organisation (sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). The information security culture 
components as identified in section 5.3.1 are not exhaustive since each organisation 
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has different information security requirements. These information security culture 
components contributed to the development of a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture – see chapter 5. 
The identification of the COSO, COBIT and ISO 27002 components as well as the 
information security culture components that may be utilised in the assessment of 
information security culture realised the fourth secondary research objective and 
answered the fourth sub question, as stated in section 1.5, namely” Which 
components could be utilised in the assessment of information security culture for 
each of the culture’s underlying levels? 
Secondary research objective 5: To describe a process for the assessment of 
information security culture for all four levels.  The assessment of information 
security culture needs to be executed via a process. The PDCA cycle utilised by 
several management systems was identified as suitable for use as a process for the 
assessment of information security culture. Section 4.4 described the PDCA cycle. 
The PDCA cycle was interpreted from an auditing perspective. The Plan stage 
defined the objective, scope and requirements of the assessment, the Do stage 
involved gaining an understanding of the information security environment and 
identified the information security culture component, the Check stage evaluated 
each component based on the applicable information security culture level while the 
Act stage reported on and concluded the assessment. The process also involved on-
going monitoring to ensure continuous improvement. The description of the PDCA 
cycle realised the fifth secondary research objective and answered the fifth sub 
question, as stated in section 1.5, namely “What process may be followed in 
assessing information security culture for all four levels?” 
By realising all 5 of the secondary research objectives, the primary research 
objective for this research study, namely, To develop a control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture across all its underlying levels, was 
achieved. This, in turn, answered the primary research question for this research 
study, namely, “How can an integrated IS auditing and process approach contribute 
to the development of a control framework for the assessment of the current state of 
information security culture across all its underlying levels?  
The next section summarises the contributions of this research study. 
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7.3 Summary of contributions 
The primary contribution of this research study is the control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture which was developed. The researcher 
hopes to publish the control framework in an appropriate forum.  
Another contribution of this research study pertains to a paper published by the 
researcher at the Information Security South Africa (ISSA) conference and which is 
attached to this research study in appendix A. 
Information security culture is a subculture of organisational culture. As 
established in literature information security culture is a complex field and, thus, the 
more research into the topic the better the understanding. Thus, this research study 
has contributed to the existing body of knowledge with regards to information 
security culture and also the way in which it may be assessed within an organisation. 
The next section discusses suggestions for future research. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for future research 
As established in section 1.3, the fostering of information security culture within an 
organisation may help to mitigate insider threat. An organisation may determine the 
state of its information security culture by assessing its information security culture. 
Following the assessment, the organisation may then effect the necessary changes 
to ensure that the insider threat is mitigated. 
It would, therefore, be beneficial if the control framework developed were 
validated in the field so as to ensure its usability with regards to assessing the 
information security culture within an organisation. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Information may be considered to be the heart of an organisation and, thus, it is 
essential that it be protected. This protection of information or information security is 
realised through the implementation of an information security management system. 
Human beings constitute the weakest link in the management of information security. 
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Many researchers have suggested the fostering of a culture of information 
security or information security culture in order to address the human factor. By 
fostering an information security culture, employees will routinely and automatically 
adhere to the information security policies. However, the first step in fostering an 
information security culture involves the assessment of the current state of such a 
culture. The assessment should be conducted in respect of all four of the levels of 
information security culture. 
This research study has presented a control framework that may be used to 
assess information security culture across all four levels. 
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A control framework for the assessment of information security 
culture 
 
Section 1: Introduction & aim of study 
The aim of this research study is to develop a formal control framework for the 
assessment of information security culture across all its underlying levels. 
Information security culture does not have a specific definition as many researchers 
have defined/described it differently. This research study adopts the description by 
Van Niekerk & Von Solms (2010) who describe information security culture as 
existing in 4 levels namely, artefacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions 
and information security knowledge. The artefacts are the visible organisational 
structures and processes; espoused values are the espoused justifications of an 
organisation; shared tacit assumptions are the ultimate source of values and action; 
and information security knowledge is required by employees in terms of their job 
functions to know what to do, how to do it and why it should be done. 
One of the challenges faced by the management of organisations with regards to 
information security is the non-compliance of employees to information security 
policies, therefore “the human factor’. In addressing the human factor challenges 
many authors have suggested the fostering of an information security culture as a 
security strategy. The first step in fostering an information security culture is to 
understand the current vs. suggested state of such a culture. In order to achieve this 
understanding, a number of researchers have focussed on the assessment of 
information security culture, i.e. Da Veiga & Eloff, Schlienger & Teufel. However, as 
published at the Information Security South Africa conference in 20121, some 
limitations were identified with the current assessment approaches namely: 
 Current information security culture assessment approaches do not assess all 
4 levels of information security culture. They focus primarily on the shared 
tacit assumption layer of such a culture. 
                                               
1
 Information security for South Africa (ISSA), 2012 (pp. 1-8). IEEE. 
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 Current information security culture researchers do not utilise a formal 
auditing guideline or framework when assessing such a culture, or do not 
explicitly espouse the use of such a framework. 
This research study therefore argues that a formal IS control framework, as an 
integrated IS auditing & process approach, can play a role in assessing the 4 levels 
of information security culture. It is not the intention of this research study to re-
invent the wheel and incorporation of this research into existing assessment 
approaches is recommended. 
This research study entails adopting principles from relevant existing IS control 
frameworks in the development of the proposed  control framework for the 
assessment of an organisation’s information security culture across all  its underlying 
levels namely artefacts, espoused values, shared tacit assumptions and information 
security knowledge. 
 
Section 2: Proposed control framework 
This section presents the proposed control framework for the assessment of 
information security culture across all its underlying levels. 
The proposed control framework incorporates 3 key aspects: 
1. A structure comprising of a number of components  
1.1 Information security culture components [ISCC] – The ISCC were 
identified from literature and are the components that contribute 
towards the creation and/or fostering of information security culture in 
an organisation. Eight components were identified and labelled as 
[ISCC1-8]. It should be noted that the information security culture 
components could vary from organisation to organisation due to 
different information security requirements. Refer to Appendix A for 
the ISCC list. 
1.2 COSO, COBIT, & ISO 27002 components – These are the identified 
COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components (control objectives) that are 
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directly applicable to information security culture. Through qualitative 
content analysis, the researcher examined COSO, COBIT & ISO 
27002 to identify the control objectives that can apply to information 
security culture. The components are classified as being directly 
applicable to information security culture if the components are 
directly relevant to information security culture and not directly 
applicable if the components are indirectly relevant to information 
security culture. For example, ISO 14 – business continuity 
management is relevant in terms of information security but not 
directly to information security culture. In which case, ISO 14 will be 
categorised as not directly applicable to information security culture. 
ISO 5 – information security policy is important in terms of information 
security culture and would be regarded as directly applicable. Refer 
to Appendix B for the lists of directly applicable COSO, COBIT and 
ISO components. 
2. Integration of identified directly applicable components – The information 
security culture components are integrated (mapped) with the applicable 
COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components for all 4 levels of information 
security culture. Refer to Table 1.1 for the integrated information security 
culture components, information security culture (ISC) levels and COSO, 
COBIT & ISO 27002 components. COSO is colour coded red, COBIT (blue) 
and ISO (green). 
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Table 1.1 Integration of ISCC, ISC levels and COSO, COBIT & ISO 27002 components 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
CULTURE COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES 
SHARED TACIT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
KNOWLEDGE 
Top management support for 
information security 
[ISCC1] 
Organisational structure & 
responsibilities for information 
security in the organisation, 
documented information security 
policy 
Management approval of information security 
policies & procedures, statement of top 
management commitment to information security 
Employees’ belief of 
management 
commitment to 
information security 
Awareness of top management buy-in is 
needed for effective information security 
COSO: control environment, 
control activities 
COSO: control environment, control activities COSO: control 
environment, control 
activities 
 
COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO4, PO6,  ME4 COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4,  PO6, ME4  COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, 
PO6, ME4 
COBIT:PO4, PO6, PO7 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Information security regulatory 
& legal requirements 
[ISCC2] 
Documented statement of 
compliance to relevant 
information security regulatory & 
legal standards 
Top management commitment to information 
security governance 
Employees believe in 
complying to applicable 
information security laws 
& regulations 
All employees understand roles & 
responsibilities to information security 
laws & regulations 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control 
environment 
COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 
Organisational structures & 
responsibilities for information 
security 
[ISCC3] 
Organisational organogram 
reflects information security 
functions 
Top management commitment to relevant 
information security structures 
Top management believe 
in necessity of 
information security 
structures & roles 
Employees are knowledgeable of 
information security roles & 
responsibilities 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control 
environment 
COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Information security budget 
[ISCC4] 
Information security budget Top management commitment to adequate 
funding for information security 
Top management 
believes that spending on 
information security is not 
a waste of money 
Decision makers are knowledgeable 
about appropriate information security 
spend 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control 
environment 
COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct 
reference 
ISO 27002: No direct reference 
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INFORMATION SECURITY 
CULTURE COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES 
SHARED TACIT 
ASSUMPTIONS 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
KNOWLEDGE 
Information security 
awareness, training & 
education 
[ISCC5] 
Awareness, training & 
educational programs/materials 
Top management commitment to relevant 
information security education for all employees  
 
Employees believe that 
information security 
training & education is 
important 
Employees have relevant information 
security knowledge & skills 
 COSO: information & 
communication 
COSO: information & communication COSO: information & 
communication 
COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 
 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 
Information security incident 
management 
[ISCC6] 
Incident management system Commitment to information security incident 
management function 
Employees believe in 
information security 
incident reporting & 
management 
Employees are knowledgeable about 
information security incident 
management system 
 COSO:  control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control 
environment 
COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 
 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Information security 
compliance 
[ISCC7] 
Employees’ key performance 
indicators (KPIs) include 
information security functions 
Enforcement of information security compliance All employees believe 
information security 
compliance is important 
Employees have the necessary skills & 
knowledge to enable information security 
compliance 
 COSO: Control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control 
environment 
COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
Continuous improvement 
through change management 
& monitoring or management 
review 
[ISCC8] 
Regular review of information 
security functions 
Commitment to regular reviews Top management believe 
continuous monitoring & 
improvement of 
information security 
functions are important 
Relevant parties are knowledgeable of 
change management and regular review 
processes for information security 
COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO8 COBIT: PO8 COBIT:PO8 COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002:10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 
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3. A process to perform the assessment – The Plan-Do-Act-Check (PDCA) 
cycle utilised by most management systems was identified as a suitable 
process that can be used for the assessment of information security culture. 
The PDCA cycle also supports our research objectives of developing an 
integrated IS auditing & process approach for the assessment of information 
security culture and so the PDCA as utilised in this research study is 
interpreted from an IS auditing perspective.  
The control framework is a high level framework with the aim of providing guidance 
(direction) to perform an assessment of information security culture for all its 
underlying levels. The proposed framework was developed with the intention to 
customise, align or integrate with existing assessment tools or methods for the 
evaluation of information security culture. The proposed framework is presented in 
Figure 1.1 
  
Figure 1.1 A control framework for the assessment of information security culture 
 
Section 3: Overview of the proposed framework 
The control framework for the assessment of information security culture provides 
general guidance to plan for, identify, evaluate and report on the information security 
Plan Do
CheckAct
Define objectives, scope and 
requirements
Understand the information 
security environment, and 
identify relevant ISC
components
Report and 
conclude 
assessment
Evaluate each                 
component based 
on applicable ISC
levels
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culture of an organisation for all its underlying levels. The control framework is based 
on the PDCA cycle and comprises of five stages: 
2. The first step is to plan the assessment (plan stage) and identify the 
information security culture assessment requirements, including 
a. Establish the objective and scope of the assessment 
b. Establish any specific requirements, assumptions or considerations 
(i.e. Will the assessment evaluate all the information security culture 
components? Will the assessment focus on all levels of information 
security culture? Will COSO, COBIT, or ISO or a combination be used 
as reference?  If the company has undergone a previous assessment, 
the recommendations from the previous assessment should be 
considered for incorporation into the present scope). 
3. After the scope has been identified, the next step (do stage) is to obtain a 
general understanding of the security environment and to identify the relevant 
assessment components based on the identified scope utilising the 
information from Table 1.1. For example: Company ABC utilised COBIT as a 
control framework and based on the understanding of their information 
security environment, the information security culture components included is 
[ISCC1, 3-8]. The scope for Company ABC in this example is shown in Table 
1.2 (the greyed cells & text are excluded from the scope). 
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Table 1.2 Example of Company ABC’s scope for the assessment of ISC 
INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE 
COMPONENTS 
ARTEFACTS ESPOUSED VALUES SHARED TACIT ASSUMPTIONS INFORMATION SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
Top management support for information 
security 
[ISCC1] 
Organisational structure & responsibilities for 
information security in the organisation, documented 
information security policy 
Management approval of information security policies & 
procedures, statement of top management commitment 
to information security 
Employees’ belief of management commitment 
to information security 
Awareness of top management buy-in is needed 
for effective information security 
COSO: control environment, control activities COSO: control environment, control activities COSO: control environment, control activities 
 
COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO4, PO6,  ME4 COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4,  PO6, ME4  COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, ME4 COBIT:PO4, PO6, PO7 
ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 5.1, 6.1, 10.1 
Information security regulatory & legal 
requirements 
[ISCC2] 
Documented statement of compliance to relevant 
information security regulatory & legal standards 
Top management commitment to information security 
governance 
Employees believe in complying to applicable 
information security laws & regulations 
All employees understand roles & responsibilities 
to information security laws & regulations 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 ISO 27002: 15.1 
Organisational structures & 
responsibilities for information security 
[ISCC3] 
Organisational organogram reflects information 
security functions 
Top management commitment to relevant information 
security structures 
Top management believe in necessity of 
information security structures & roles 
Employees are knowledgeable of information 
security roles & responsibilities 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: Information & communication 
COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 COBIT: PO4 
ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 ISO 27002: 6.1, 10.1 
Information security budget 
[ISCC4] 
Information security budget Top management commitment to adequate funding for 
information security 
Top management believes that spending on 
information security is not a waste of money 
Decision makers are knowledgeable about 
appropriate information security spend 
COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 COBIT: PO5, DS6 
ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference ISO 27002: No direct reference 
Information security awareness, training & 
education 
[ISCC5] 
Awareness, training & educational programs/materials Top management commitment to relevant information 
security education for all employees  
 
Employees believe that information security 
training & education is important 
Employees have relevant information security 
knowledge & skills 
 COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 COBIT: PO7, DS7 
 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 ISO 27002: 8.2 
Information security incident management 
[ISCC6] 
Incident management system Commitment to information security incident 
management function 
Employees believe in information security 
incident reporting & management 
Employees are knowledgeable about information 
security incident management system 
 COSO:  control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 COBIT: DS8 
 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 ISO 27002: 13.1, 13.2 
Information security compliance 
[ISCC7] 
Employees’ key performance indicators (KPIs) include 
information security functions 
Enforcement of information security compliance All employees believe information security 
compliance is important 
Employees have the necessary skills & 
knowledge to enable information security 
compliance 
 COSO: Control environment COSO: control environment COSO: control environment COSO: information & communication 
 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 COBIT: ME3 
 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 ISO 27002: 15.1, 15.2 
Continuous improvement through change 
management & monitoring or 
management review 
[ISCC8] 
Regular review of information security functions Commitment to regular reviews Top management believe continuous monitoring 
& improvement of information security functions 
are important 
Relevant parties are knowledgeable of change 
management and regular review processes for 
information security 
COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: Monitoring COSO: information & communication 
COBIT: PO8 COBIT: PO8 COBIT:PO8 COBIT: PO8 
ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002:10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 ISO 27002: 10.10 
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4. The next step (check stage) evaluates the overall information security culture, 
for the identified components (from do stage), in terms of the conceptual 
model presented by Van Niekerk & Von Solms (2010). For example, taking 
the assessment of top management support for information security culture 
[ISCC1] across all levels of information security culture as shown in figure 1.2, 
the finding is that the espoused values are desirable but the employees lack 
the necessary information security knowledge (red arrow) and do not have the 
desired beliefs and values (red arrow) with the result that the artefact level is 
insecure (red arrow). In this case both the information security knowledge and 
the beliefs and values of the employees should be addressed. Based on the 
mapping with COBIT, the recommended control that needs to be implemented 
to address this weakness is: COBIT: PO1, PO3, PO4, PO6, PO7, and ME4. 
 
BL = Minimum acceptable baseline 
SL = Nett security level 
AF= Artefacts 
EV = Espoused values 
STA= Shared tacit assumptions 
ISK= Information security knowledge
Assess AF
Assess EV
Assess STA
Assess ISK
Assess top management 
support for information  
security
Evalute result for 
each level
S
L
AF
M
o
re
 s
e
cu
re
L
e
ss
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STA
ISK
Level of security
B
L
 
Figure 1.2 Example of the evaluation of top management support for ISC  
From figure 1.2 it is evident that the net effect of information security culture can be 
positively or negatively influenced by how “secure” the underlying levels of 
information security culture are and the information security culture components can 
contribute towards this influence. 
5. In the next stage (act stage), the assessment is concluded with a report to 
management. The report typically includes an executive summary, the 
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purpose of the assessment and date, summary of the scope, summary of 
results, findings and recommendations and a conclusion.  
 
It is important to ensure that the desired information security culture is maintained 
through continuous monitoring and review (as illustrated by the arrows in the middle 
of Figure 1.1). 
 
Section 4: Requirements for expert reviews 
The aim of the expert review is to refine the framework based on your inputs and 
motivations. Please answer the questions that follow with regards to the framework 
1. Please provide a description of your work experiences and job descriptions (to 
motivate relevance as expert reviewer) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Any comments, critique or additions to the structure, components and/or 
process used to develop the framework. Please motivate your answer. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Do you think that the presented framework can contribute in closing the gaps 
identified in current assessment approaches (please refer to attached ISSA 
paper for more detail regarding the identified gaps)? Please motivate your 
answer. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. Would you like to add or remove anything from the proposed framework? 
Please motivate your answer. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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5. Any other comments 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section 5: Appendices 
 
5.1: Appendix A 
Information security culture components: 
 Top management support for information security [ISCC1] 
 Regulatory & legal requirement for information security [ISCC2] 
 Organisational structures & responsibilities for information security [ISCC3] 
 Information security budget [ISCC4] 
 Information security awareness, training & education [ISCC5] 
 Information security incident management [ISCC6] 
 Information security compliance [ISCC7] 
 Continuous improvement through change management & monitoring or 
management review [ISCC8] 
5.2: Appendix B 
Directly applicable COSO, COBIT and ISO components: 
Applicable COSO components 
 COSO - control environment 
 COSO - control activities 
 COSO - information & communication 
 COSO - monitoring 
Applicable COBIT components (plan & organise – PO, deliver & support – DS, 
monitor & evaluate – ME) 
 PO1: Defining a strategic information security plan 
 PO3: Determining technological direction for information security 
 PO4: Defining information security processes, organisation & relationships in 
terms of information security 
 PO5: Managing information security investment 
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 PO6: Communicating management aims & direction in terms of information 
security 
 PO7: Managing IT human resources with regards to information security 
 PO8: Managing quality 
 DS5: Ensuring systems security 
 DS6: Identifying & allocating information security costs 
 DS7: Educating & training users in terms of information security 
 DS8: Managing service desk & information security incidents 
 ME3: Ensuring information security regulatory compliance 
 ME4: Providing information security governance 
 
Applicable ISO 27002 components 
 ISO 5.1: Information security policy 
 ISO 6.1: Internal organisation 
 ISO 10.1: Operational procedures & responsibilities 
 ISO 10.10: Monitoring 
 ISO 13.1: Reporting information security incidents 
 ISO 13.2: Managing information security incidents 
 ISO 15.1: Compliance with information security legal requirements 
 ISO 15.2: Compliance with information security policies & standards 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INPUT 
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Appendix C 
 
Feedback from expert reviewer 1 
Dr A. Da Veiga 
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Appendix D 
 
Feedback from expert reviewer 2  
Dr M. Gerber 
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